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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
This week-long course explores the current debate about America’s “grand strategy,” taking as our analytical point d’appui the current war in Ukraine. In particular, we will be looking at the policy orientation that more than a few Americans in this electoral season have been extolling as the nearest thing to strategic nirvana. This is the holy grail of reclaiming the country’s “strategic autonomy,” a goal that has usually, in American foreign policy lore, borne the label of “isolationism.” From the origins of the Republic in 1788 until the Second World War, isolationism could, with reason, have been considered to be the “default setting” of America’s grand strategy. In the aftermath of its intervention in the Second World War, however, it had generally come to be assumed by the foreign policy pundits that the probability of isolationism ever getting resurrected was basically zero. Recently, however, scholars and other observers of the American political scene have been reconsidering whether isolationism truly was something that could be deemed dead and buried. Like Lazarus, it shows signs of returning to life. This growing interest in isolationism, on the part of both those who welcome it and those who abhor it, has of course been stimulated by the electoral prospects of Donald J. Trump, who aspires this coming November to do what no other president in American history, with the single exception of Grover Cleveland in the 19th century, had ever done: to return to the White House after having been unsuccessful in a bid for re-election. Cleveland, first elected in 1884, managed to do this after being rebuffed by the voters in 1888, only to have those same voters restore him to power in 1892. Because he served two discontinuous terms as president, Cleveland is registered as having been his country’s 22nd and its 24th president. Donald Trump, should he win this autumn, would thus become America’s 47th president, after having been its 45th one. As interesting as this recording anomaly may be, what is really consequential about a second Trump administration is its potential foreign policy orientation, particularly in light of America’s current level of commitment to Ukraine in its war against Russia. During this electoral season, debates between Republicans aspiring to attain their party’s nomination have occasionally shone the spotlight on that country, with some of the presidential aspirants – especially Vivek Ramaswamy and, to a lesser degree, Ron DeSantis – indicating that they feel supporting Ukraine to be something that is not in America’s national interest. Trump himself has also expressed less than rhetorical solidarity with Kyiv, and he is never hesitant to proclaim his goal as that of putting “America first,” as he phrased it after his victory in the Iowa caucuses on 15 January of this year. As a slogan, “America first” is usually associated with the powerful isolationist forces that figured so largely in the debates of the period just prior to America’s entry into the Second World War. At the minimum, “America first” is assumed to mean that the United States would, under a second Trump administration, be taking a much more critical assessment of the value of its alliances than has been the case for all administrations since NATO was formed in 1949. |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
In this week-long course, we will be discussing America’s grand strategy with a focus on the country’s transatlantic security relationships, as those have been assessed and debated within the context of the current war in Ukraine. Of particular interest to students in Prague will be the claim, made by some US scholarly circles (for instance, John Mearsheimer) that the US and its allies are basically at fault for the Ukraine war, because of the decision to enlarge NATO after the ending of the Cold War. That decision, announced at NATO’s Madrid summit in the summer of 1997, resulted in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary entering the alliance two years later. The main objective of the course will thus be the assessment and critical evaluation of such claims. |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
Viz výše soubor se sylabem kurzu / See the file containing the course syllabus above. |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
The Code of Study and Examination of Charles University in Prague provides the general framework of study rules at the university. According to art. 6, par. 17 of this Code, “a student may not take any examination in any subject entered in his study plan more than three times, i.e. he shall have the right to two resit dates; no extraordinary resit date shall be permitted. (…) If a student fails to appear for an examination on the date for which he has enrolled without duly excusing himself, he shall not be marked; the provision of neither this nor of the first sentence shall constitute the right to arrange for a special examination date.” Any written assignment composed by the student shall be an original piece. The practices of plagiarism, defined by the Dean’s Provision no. 18/2015, are seen as “a major violation of the rules of academic ethics” and “will be penalized in accordance with Disciplinarian Regulations of the faculty.” |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
Seminar 1: Conceptual and Theoretical Brush-Clearing Required readings:
Seminar 2: “Theorizing” Donald J. Trump Required readings:
Seminar 3: NATO Enlargement and the Return of the “Russian Problem” Required readings:
Seminar 4: The Ukraine Conundrum Required readings:
Seminar 5: The View from Ottawa and Prague: China and the Transatlantic Allies Required readings:
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (25.03.2024)
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
Seminar 1: Conceptual and Theoretical Brush-Clearing Seminar 2: “Theorizing” Donald J. Trump Seminar 3: NATO Enlargement and the Return of the “Russian Problem” Seminar 4: The Ukraine Conundrum Seminar 5: The View from Ottawa and Prague: China and the Transatlantic Allies |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
Viz výše soubor se sylabem kurzu / See the file containing the course syllabus above. |
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Poslední úprava: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (18.01.2024)
Viz výše soubor se sylabem kurzu / See the file containing the course syllabus above. |