

Impermissible Harms: Global Poverty and Global Justice

For the first time in human history it is quite feasible, economically to wipe out hunger and preventable diseases worldwide without real inconvenience to anyone.

Pogge 2002: 14

Is hunger a misfortune which calls for beneficence and help? . . . or is ending hunger a matter of justice?

O'Neill 1986: 3

Introduction

The early years of the twenty-first century have been unusual from the international perspective because they have witnessed, for possibly the first time in human history, a near global awareness that the vast differences in life chances, quality of life and standards of living between the rich and the poor *globally* is a matter of political and ethical significance for everybody. In 2000, members of the UN signed up to the UN Millennium Goals. The UN millennium goals were a response to the idea that global poverty was a serious challenge for the international system and that something could be done about it collectively. This campaign has been accompanied by a high-profile public campaign called Make Poverty History, intended to keep the eyes of the world focused on the task.

This chapter addresses the ethical issues arising from the existence

of severe widespread poverty, or destitution (understood as the point at which life is unsustainable), on a global scale (see Nandy 2002 on the distinction between poverty and destitution). The focus of this chapter is in understanding exactly what type of moral problem global poverty presents and for whom, and on assessing the different responses to it. Recognizing the existence of global poverty provokes the question of whose (moral) responsibility is it? That is: 'who has what obligations to end the everyday suffering of millions of people'? Another way of thinking about this is to ask: is poverty in fact a global problem, for everyone, or is it primarily a problem for the people of poor countries? The issue of severe global poverty or destitution provides perhaps the most important moral challenge to the view that compatriots should always or automatically take priority over outsiders and humanity. If we indeed argue that severe poverty, or destitution, is primarily a local problem then we are effectively abandoning the poor to their fate. Given the numbers of people today classified as destitute this is, to say the least, morally troubling.

Without a doubt, most academic attempts to address the problem of global poverty rely upon or are derived from some or other account of distributive justice: the distribution of rights, duties and material resources. The issue of global justice has perhaps more than any other helped to define liberal cosmopolitanism over and against anti-cosmopolitanism. As David Miller (2002: 976) notes, cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans differ thus: 'cosmopolitans advocate global principles of distributive justice, anti-cosmopolitans hold that distributive principles only apply within nations and other smaller communities'. This would suggest that anti-cosmopolitans are indeed willing to abandon the poor to their fate. However, while such a conclusion might seem to follow logically from the 'communitarian' rejection of universalism, it would not accurately portray the position of many anti-cosmopolitans. The chief difference between cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans in the case of global poverty concerns whether global poverty is subject to justice, or whether it is covered by natural duties or humanitarianism. In other words, the argument is over whether global poverty is the subject of mutual aid, beneficence or justice?

Deciding on this matter requires answering a number of questions. What are the circumstances of justice and do they apply in the case of global poverty? If they do not exist, then what if any obligations or duties do the rich have to the poor? In addition, because poverty is a moral question it also requires an analysis of the nature of moral obligation and its relationship to questions of causation and capacity. In other words, what role does cause play in assessing responsibility?

This chapter begins with a discussion of world poverty and some historical background. It then discusses the liberal cosmopolitan claim that Rawlsian principles of distributive justice are global and the anti-cosmopolitan critique of this claim. For anti-cosmopolitans, global *inequality* is not in itself a morally troubling issue because different societies value the distribution of resources differently. Global *poverty*, however, remains a serious moral problem and anti-cosmopolitans argue that a policy of basic rights and natural duties, mutual aid and the commitment to do no harm, can address it adequately. The next sections demonstrate that a far-reaching account of global justice can be derived from natural duties and basic rights. In particular, it will be demonstrated that the strongest arguments for responsibilities to address global poverty extend from cosmopolitan readings of the principles of mutual aid and the duty to do no harm, and these are reconcilable with the values of communal autonomy and cultural diversity.

Historical background

The emergence of a truly global international system in the twentieth century brought with it a consciousness for many, for the first time, that there might be good reason for considering ourselves to have binding moral obligations to people in all parts of the world. As we have seen, this was not a new thought. The Stoics, the Christians and Kant all worked on the argument that the human species was indivisible. However, these voices were less appealing when there was little or no sense that the world was actually interconnected. What happened in faraway places was the concern of those directly and perceptibly affected by them. Arguably, this was because prior to nineteenth-century imperialism, and twentieth-century globalization, the impact of many human decisions was felt by relatively few. A decision made in an imperial capital could affect the lives of millions of subjects, but a decision made in an Indian or Polynesian village, for instance, was not seen to have any appreciable impact on the imperial core.

In the twentieth century, and especially the late twentieth century, the emergence of a global trading system and the global rules under the GATT, along with decolonization, brought about an awareness that economically and politically there was a degree of global interdependence and unity. Decisions made in any part of the world could have an impact and, more importantly still, be seen to have an impact

upon people in almost any other part of the world. So what happened in an Indian village (or in a million Indian villages) was seen to be of some importance to people beyond that village.

The emergence of a global trading regime after the Second World War, along with the difficulties that many newly independent countries faced in competing in this regime, raised the issue of global justice in two ways. First, there might be an obligation on behalf of the former colonial powers to make some redress for the costs borne by their former subjects. Continued poverty and economic underdevelopment in the third world were seen to be a result of imperialism and therefore there was a degree of historical restitution, or retributive justice, with a responsibility to compensate on the part of imperialists.

At the same time, in the economically developed parts of the world the post-Second World War period saw the triumph of the welfare state. The welfare state encapsulated the rejection of the nineteenth-century idea that 'the poor are always with us' and the complacency that such a belief engenders. Instead, the post-war period was characterized by the idea that solutions could be found to both domestic and international problems, which previously had been thought irresolvable. Poverty in many first-world countries was drastically reduced in the economic boom following the Second World War and by the adoption of welfare practices targeting the poor in these states.

In this context, many people began to argue that the obligation to end poverty was not one that ended at the national border but extended across the globe. This development was spurred on by the recognition of increasing levels of economic interdependence between states. Indeed, the contemporary debate about global justice can be characterized as a debate that focuses on the nature of the moral obligations arising from economic interdependence. In turn, the different arguments regarding global justice extend from different accounts of the nature of this economic interdependence.

The extent of hunger inequality and poverty

In order to understand why many think that global poverty is a moral issue for everyone, it is best to begin with what is currently known about the extent and nature of poverty, understood on a global scale. According to Thomas Pogge, citing the World Development Report, '[A]bout one-quarter of all human beings alive today, 1.5 billion, subsist below the international poverty line' (2001: 7). The poverty

line is defined as the level of 'income or expenditure below which a minimum nutritionally adequate diet plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable' (UNDP 1996: 222, cited in Pogge 2001b). According to Pogge, this means that 790 million persons are malnourished, 'while one billion are without adequate shelter and two billion without electricity' (2001b: 8). The extent of global poverty and hunger and the unequal distribution of the world's wealth means that starvation and preventable diseases cause about one third of all human deaths, which was about 18 million in 1988. Pogge points out that this contrasts with the estimated number of deaths due to war at 588,000 and 'other homicides and violence' at 736,000 (2001b: 9).¹

These figures point to the extent of severe poverty around the globe, understood as the capacity to maintain basic health and bodily integrity. Severe poverty of this type and extent, on this scale, should in itself be a cause for concern because of the sheer amount of human suffering it involves. This is further increased if we also examine the distribution of wealth globally. Poverty, or destitution, is cause for concern because of the human suffering involved, but it may be that there is not enough wealth to go around to end it. If this were the case, then it might be possible to say that indeed the 'poor are always with us' and that there is little that can be done until such time as population and resources are in balance.

While that may have been the case at a certain time in the past, an analysis of contemporary distribution of wealth suggests it is no longer so. Looking at the same statistics in another way, the global distribution of wealth is hugely unequal and the gap between the richest and poorest people in the world is not closing but is becoming greater. According to Pogge, 'The income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960' (2001b: 13). This amounts to a situation in which 'the collective income of the bottom quintile is about US\$100 billion annually, or one-third of one percent of the annual global product, the high income economies have 14.9 percent of world population and 78.4 percent of the global product' (2004: 18). In other words, 'one percent of our collective income is equivalent to 235 percent of theirs' (Pogge 2004: 34-5).²

The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that the problem of poverty is not getting better despite the global economic boom period of the last twenty years. Nor has the end of the Cold War delivered the peace dividend that was hoped for, while it had (at least until September 2001) meant a decline in military spending overall. That means the benefits of the current international order have not flowed to the poorest persons. What this level of inequality illustrates

is not that there is not enough wealth to go around, but that the existing wealth is distributed unequally, and not just unequally, but grossly unequally.

Therefore it ought to be possible to redistribute resources and wealth in order to eradicate severe global poverty; 'with this tremendous upsurge in global inequality comes a dramatic increase in human capabilities to eliminate severe poverty' (Pogge 2002b: 152). Furthermore, many argue it can be done without a devastating or even significant cost to the most developed countries.

However, it is by no means obvious to everyone that the mere existence of inequality, poverty and hunger means that those with the capacity to alleviate them have an obligation to do so. Furthermore, once an obligation has been established, the question then arises of how that obligation can be fulfilled, how far it extends and what it consists of. The next sections explore these questions.

Cosmopolitanism: justice and global poverty

Justice is a term that has many meanings and can be used in many ways. Hedley Bull, in his much discussed 'Hagey Lectures', used it to refer to what is more commonly known as international ethics (Bull 1983). Lawyers use the term to denote conformity with legal rulings and process, in the sense that justice has been done when the law has been followed and upheld. However, for political philosophers, justice is associated with the values of fairness and equality. Justice as a general concept means to treat like cases alike and to treat people according to fair rules. Fairness of this sort is embodied in the value of equality, because to treat people equally means to treat them in a like fashion. Therefore, for political philosophers, justice is usually related to the value of equality of all human beings. Justice occurs when people are treated equally by political, economic and social institutions and laws. Much of political philosophy has been concerned with discussing how people are equal and how this equality should be recognized in law and society. Justice can also be discussed in terms of substantive and procedural justice. Substantive justice refers to the equality of outcomes and the distribution of wealth or power, that is, distributive justice. Procedural justice refers to a fair procedure for deciding who should get what. For example, a world in which there was no poverty might be considered substantively just, but if that situation was arrived at by discriminating against certain categories of people then we might think it was unjust in a procedural sense.

Cosmopolitan responses to the existence of massive and severe poverty on a global scale can be understood as primarily either moral cosmopolitan or global egalitarian. Global egalitarian accounts are dominated by Rawlsian liberals who are concerned with justice as distributive justice. These authors express a technical concern with getting the theory of justice right. Rawls argued that justice begins with the 'basic structure' of society, by which he meant 'the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation' (Rawls 1972: 7; see chapter 2). Global egalitarianism extends from principles that are internal to this conception of justice.

On the other hand, moral cosmopolitanism responds to the recognition of gross inequality and of certain moral emergencies, such as the existence of massive global poverty. These types of arguments state that there exist responsibilities to act to alleviate suffering. They are motivated by action, what it is right to do, rather than simply with what is right in theory. Kantianism and utilitarianism are both moral cosmopolitan approaches. The most important question raised by these accounts is whether the rich have an obligation to the poor because they are rich, or because they can help, or whether such responsibilities flow from the role the rich may have played in causing or maintaining poverty in poor countries. This contrasts with the global egalitarian account, which focuses on whether distributive justice applies globally, that is, if the conditions of distributive justice are present at the global level. Understanding this difference is helpful in making sense of the sometimes technical nature of the debate and in clarifying what is at stake for different authors.

Of course, there is no clear division between these two approaches and both draw upon each other, while the arguments of the first are certainly made more compelling by the existence of the second. The basic common position here is that the world exhibits inequality and that there are substantive obligations to address this inequality, especially in the case of global poverty. Discussion of this aspect necessarily leads, as we shall see, to discussion of the first type: if there is global inequality, to what extent ought we to design new principles of international political order which will prevent or alleviate it?

In other words, there is an obligation on all those who are able to address and eradicate global poverty and gross inequality. Utilitarians and contractarian deontologists all agree on this point. However, within this, there are substantive disagreements about how these obligations are derived, and how they might be carried out. The question, then, is not merely how to address global poverty. It seems pretty clear a relatively minor shift of wealth from rich to poor could do this. The

question is, rather, what principles ought to provide the basis of a global account of justice and the problem of global poverty?

The contractarian account

The liberal cosmopolitan account of global distributive justice, largely inspired by and derived from a broadly Rawlsian account of justice, has been the most comprehensive attempt to deal with this issue in the international realm. Consequently, it has also provoked the most comment and criticism and, as already stated, has provided the focus for the anti-cosmopolitan rejection of cosmopolitanism. This section discusses the liberal claim that a Rawlsian account of justice can be unproblematically globalized, before moving on to the anti-cosmopolitan rejection of this argument.

The basics of the contractarian account of cosmopolitanism were set out in chapter 2. For liberals like Charles Beitz, the requirement to develop an egalitarian global basic structure flows from the account of justice developed by Rawls, and the most common approaches to global justice have, until very recently, been applications of Rawls's theory of justice. Thomas Pogge, Brian Barry and Simon Caney begin with certain Rawlsian presuppositions, even if they do not agree with Rawls's conclusions regarding the composition of a basic structure. What they all agree upon is that any account of justice must be cosmopolitan, in the sense defined by Pogge. In other words, it must be universalist, individualist and impartial. These criteria mean that justice is global or, alternatively, any account of distributive justice that does not address it from a global position is seriously deficient.

For the purposes of this section, there are two components that are relevant here. The Rawlsian approaches argue that the essential features of Rawls's account were universalizable. From this, it follows that cosmopolitans concerned with global justice are predominantly, but not exclusively, concerned with the basic structure of global society, that is, with the ways in which the rules of global order distribute rights, duties and the benefits of social cooperation (i.e., economic activity). For these liberals, Rawls's substantive accounts of justice, as well as his mechanism for arriving at it, provide the criteria for assessing injustice globally and for envisaging a different world order.

Because justice is universal, the difference principle must apply globally to individuals and not states. What ultimately matters is how poor or badly off you are *in the world*, and not just in your own

country. Justice requires a system in which all the rules are organized to maximize the outcome of the worst off globally. The basic structure of international relations should be governed, not by inter-state principles, but by cosmopolitan ones that address the inequalities between individuals rather than states. Justice involves 'a just and stable institutional scheme preserving a distribution of basic rights, opportunities and . . . goods that is fair both globally and within each nation' (Pogge 1989: 256). In this regard, liberal Rawlsians agree with Singer and other cosmopolitans 'that we should value equality between societies, and at the global level as much as we value political equality within one society' (Singer 2002: 190). They come to this conclusion by arguing that we must begin with a cosmopolitan original position, not just a national one. There is no need for a second contract between the representatives of peoples because the first 'original' one will necessarily be universally inclusive.

Beitz's argument was that we should consider the world economy a single 'system of social cooperation' in the Rawlsian sense. Therefore, Rawlsian accounts of justice ought to apply to the globe as a whole. As noted in chapter 2, most critics believe that Rawls's conclusions do not follow from his argument and that he is open to much more cosmopolitan interpretations (see chapter 2 and below). According to these authors, there is nothing within the Rawlsian framework that suggests the need to restrict its account of justice to the domestic state. Indeed, there are grounds from within Rawls's approach that lead us to *necessarily* take a cosmopolitan stand, if we accept his other arguments. The Rawlsian account is universalizable for at least two reasons: first because of its account of the nature of the moral person, and, second, because of the economic interdependence of the global system (see chapter 2).

Perhaps the most important aspect of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is this second claim that it is no longer possible to justify treating states as self-enclosed separate isolated systems. Beitz, Pogge, Moellendorf and most other critics argue that empirically and analytically Rawls's assumptions about enclosed autonomous states simply don't add up. Instead, there is a single global economic network of interdependence. States are intricately interconnected and very few, if any, can claim to be entirely outside the global economic order. For Beitz, once this is recognized, the original position can be globalized. As a result, we can claim that the equivalent of a scheme for mutual gain exists and that 'all that is required [for justice] is that interdependence produce benefits and burdens' (Beitz 1979: 153). Therefore, given that we have an interdependent global economic order that produces benefits and burdens, it follows that

the principles of justice apply. More recently, Beitz has emphasized that global inequality and poverty, increasing interdependence, articulation of international institutions and regimes, and the emergence of a global civil society combine to create the condition of a global basic structure (Beitz 1999).

For global egalitarians, Rawlsian method provides the criteria by which the international economic order can be judged and by which global inequality can be interpreted and responsibility for it assigned. From a cosmopolitan Rawlsian position, the basic structure of international society is profoundly unjust and in need of transformation. The existence of massive and severe global poverty represents a failure of the international order to meet standards of justice. Once we accept Rawls's criterion of the difference principle that all inequalities must benefit the position of the worst off, it then follows upon examination that the international order is unjust and in need of reformulation. The second part of Rawls's theory then comes into play here as it provides the basis of that reordering. The structure of international trade and economic interdependence should ensure that, despite an unequal distribution of material resources worldwide, no one should be unable to meet their basic requirements; nor should they suffer disproportionately from the lack of material resources. While Beitz, Pogge and Moellendorf have some differences over the exact mechanisms for addressing inequalities, they nonetheless agree that the rules must improve the conditions of the least well-off members of the human race - that is, 'it is the globally least advantaged representative person . . . whose position is to be maximized' (Beitz 1979: 152).

The fundamental insight to be drawn from the Rawlsian cosmopolitan account is that it attempts to provide a single set of criteria by which global inequality, including severe poverty, can be assessed, and an argument that the conditions for meeting those criteria are existent. We can also recall that Rawls stated there is a duty to create a just basic structure. Global egalitarianism does not extend directly from a recognition of the needs of the poorest peoples or any particular moral emergency. At its simplest, it can be understood as a claim that we ought to live in a just world order, followed by a consequent claim about what that order might look like. It is, in a sense, independent of any empirical inequality or injustice in the current system. It is concerned with defining principles that are just in and of themselves, and about defining the principles and procedures for a just community that happens to be global. For cosmopolitan Rawlsians, this means there is a consequent duty to reform the international order and create a just global basic structure. Both of these claims

are either rejected or seriously qualified by the communitarian and pluralist arguments.

Anti-cosmopolitan critics of global distributive justice

Simon Caney has identified three types of anti-cosmopolitan position on global distributive justice: the nationalist, the society of states (pluralist) and the realist. For our purposes, it is the nationalist and the pluralist accounts which have most to say about the problem of global poverty. All three, as has already been noted in chapter 3, rely upon broadly speaking communitarian assumptions and therefore reject the broad cosmopolitan claim that morality is necessarily universal, individualist and impartial. Therefore, they also reject the basis for Beitz's claim that global duties of distributive justice exist. In Walzer's terminology, distributive justice involves the imposition of thick moralities and constitutes a too-thick conception of universal morality.

The most important thing to note about the anti-cosmopolitan position on global poverty is that it is almost entirely structured as a response to the Rawlsian accounts of global distributive justice. Indeed, for Miller, cosmopolitanism and global distributive justice are virtually synonymous. For anti-cosmopolitans, the problem of global poverty cannot be met by any single scheme of global distributive justice, and indeed they dispute the idea that there is any substantive global or international responsibility to develop a universal scheme of distributive justice. However, this is not the end of the issue because, they argue, we can still recognize duties to the global starving, such as mutual aid, that come from other less ambitious accounts of morality.

The anti-cosmopolitan position is in part a response to the liberal conception of justice as impartial, universal and individualistic, wherein national or communal allegiances are irrelevant and arbitrary from a moral (impartial) point of view. Thus, starting with an account of cosmopolitanism as an impartial, universal and egalitarian position, Beitz et al. end up with a fairly 'thick' account of justice derived from within the framework of twentieth-century American liberalism. Because they accept the basic principles of Rawlsian liberalism, but reject its limited scope, cosmopolitanism becomes globalized (Rawlsian) liberalism. Their critics, and Rawls himself, identify this project as the universalization of a culturally particular conception of justice with dubious applicability to other societies.

National duties and natural duties

Caney (2001a: 980) argues that common to the 'nationalist' anti-cosmopolitan thesis are three claims: what might be termed the 'national duties' thesis; the 'viability' thesis; and the 'allocation of duty' thesis. These three claim, first, that national compatriots take first priority, and, second, that the conditions necessary for a global account of distributive justice are non-existent (a single global political community or state), therefore the project is not viable, and, third, that the responsibility for meeting justice globally is allocated to individual nation-states and not a world system or world authority. In the national duties thesis, 'individuals bear special obligations of distributive justice to other members of their nation' (Caney 2001a: 980). That is, we owe some things first and foremost to our own nationals and sometimes to the exclusion of outsiders. These duties are generated by, for Miller, shared national culture and history and by a claim that it is primarily within nations that economic exchange occurs and goods are distributed; that is, that nations represent systems of social cooperation in Rawls's model.

The second thesis states that Justice requires a state and/or a shared culture that provide the basic values from which principles are determined. For the critics of global justice, these conditions simply do not apply globally: 'systems of distributive justice, to be feasible, must map onto national communities and hence that global systems of distributive justice are unworkable' (Caney 2001a: 981). In other words, nations provide the conditions of possibility for justice, because they provide the common normative framework and shared social practices that distributive justice requires. Indeed, they are exacerbated by the sheer diversity of different conceptions of the 'good' across the world. Distributive justice can only occur within a single, sovereign state; we may call this the Hobbesian clause, and it is in a sense prior to the viability clause (see Nagel 2005). It is really a condition of possibility clause. Global distributive justice is unviable because there is not and cannot be, or is unlikely to be, any global state or any global political community from which it can be grounded or enforced.

The allocation of duties argument contains two components. The first is that responsibility for distributive justice and addressing poverty is a national responsibility. It is the duty of individual nations to fulfil their obligations to their own members first. David Miller agrees with the claim that individuals have rights - a 'human right to liberty, security and subsistence' (Shue's basic rights), but the responsibility for fulfilling this right lies primarily, in the first instance, with

fellow nationals (Miller 2007). For Miller, the primacy of national responsibility also involves the claim that 'we are not in most cases required by justice to intervene to safeguard the human rights of foreigners' (1988: 80). Thus, global justice understood in terms of the recognition of basic rights is best served by national schemes rather than cosmopolitan or global ones. The second significant aspect of the allocation thesis is the recognition of transnational natural duties of 'humanitarianism' or mutual aid. Where there are transborder duties, they are of these limited kinds.

Somewhat ironically, it is Rawls himself who has provided the most stark account of the pluralist (or social liberal) account of global justice in *The Law of Peoples* (1999). Rawls has systematized the general pluralist and 'nationalist' argument against global distributive justice, and in so doing provides a clear account of why these duties do not apply globally and what obligations take their place. The most important thing that Rawls does is to make clear the underlying assumptions of the anti-cosmopolitan position regarding responsibility. Rawls makes it clear that national, not global, societies bear both causal responsibility and curative, or moral, responsibility for poverty.

Rawls and the international

According to Rawls, liberal states have no cosmopolitan duties to globalize their own conception of distributive justice (1999). The Rawlsian theory of justice is based on an assumption about its compatibility with certain values, the reflective equilibrium of values common to liberal, and particularly American, society. As such, it is an account of justice for liberal societies. Rawls's concern in *The Law of Peoples* is not with an account of justice but with the principles that ought to guide a liberal state in its relationships with other 'decent', but not necessarily liberal, states. According to Rawls, a decent liberal state has no duty to globalize its conception of distributive justice or of liberalism itself. Liberal states must accept the fact of reasonable pluralism and acknowledge the possibility that non-liberal accounts of justice might be acceptable.

It follows from this that they have only limited responsibilities to address global poverty. Ultimately, for Rawls, it is not the extent of economic interaction that determines the bounds of moral obligation, but the norms that govern basic institutions. The origins of Rawls's account in a specific liberal tradition which is the heritage of

the Western Enlightenment undermines any claim to cross cultural appeal which might allow it to form the basis of a 'thick' global overlapping consensus. This restriction of his own principle extends from the recognition that the conception of the moral person upon which his theory is based is not uncontested and therefore can only be universalized problematically. Even if economic interdependence existed to the extent claimed by Beitz et al., fundamental cultural differences mean that the Rawlsian account of justice would be unable to resonate at a global level. In other words, not only is there no global political culture, but there is also radical value incommensurability.³ So, while the parties to the second contracting session of decent societies can agree on some quite substantive values, they are not capable of agreeing on principles of distributive justice.

Equally importantly, Rawls argued that justice is only possible in the presence of a 'system of social cooperation for mutual gain' which produces a surplus product. He argues that the international realm does not resemble a system for mutual advantage. Instead, controversially, he proposes that societies are to be understood in isolation, as if they have only minimal impact upon each other, and are therefore only minimally bound together by webs of interdependence. For Rawls, communities are restricted in their interactions and so restricted in their obligations. The conditions required for global distributive justice are not present. There is no global system of cooperation or any thick global political culture, and no morally significant economic interactions between communities. Therefore, the best that can be hoped for is a 'law of peoples', which covers rules of coexistence between liberal and other decent peoples, such as self-determination, Just War, mutual recognition (sovereignty), non-intervention, mutual aid and human rights (Rawls 1999). *The Law of Peoples* is not concerned with inequalities between societies.

If global distributive justice is inapplicable to the international realm that still leaves open the question of moral responsibility for the current state of global poverty. Rawls rejects the idea that there are significant international or global causes of poverty. Strictly speaking, Rawls and anti-cosmopolitans would reject the idea of 'global' poverty as anything other than the sum total of national poverty.

Despite these reservations, Rawls does not wish to suggest that liberal states abandon the poor to their suffering. *The Law of Peoples* does not tolerate severe global poverty because decent states have a duty of mutual aid. In Rawls's case, this extends to a duty to provide humanitarian aid, to assist what he calls burdened societies in becoming decent societies that fulfil basic human rights. A just law of peoples therefore also includes 'a duty to assist other peoples

living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having just or decent political and social regimes' (Rawls 1999: 37). Once a society has become well ordered and decent, then it becomes self-sustaining and no longer needs to be assisted. However, there are no substantive ongoing institutional distributional responsibilities. The duty of assistance is not a commitment to open-ended or permanent transfers of resources in order to achieve global egalitarianism. Kokaz claims that mutual aid is defended by Rawls as a condition of sociability; without it there can be no society, not even a society of peoples (Kokaz 2007). She argues that this principle, along with the inclusion of universal human rights, provides the basis for a global poverty eradication principle from within *The Law of Peoples*.

For Rawls, the principles of mutual aid, human rights and duty of assistance, if fulfilled, would create a world of decent, if not liberal, societies, in which everyone's basic rights were met. This necessarily would be a world without severe hunger, destitution and poverty. As Beitz notes, in the non-ideal world this represents a significant requirement of some form of global distribution of resources on the part of the most well-off states which far outstrips present practices (Beitz 2000). However, it would be a world in which there would still be possibly quite serious inequalities in wealth and which would still therefore be unjust in cosmopolitan Rawlsian terms.

After Rawls, the most sophisticated and thoroughgoing attempt to spell out an alternative to global egalitarianism has been David Miller's account of national responsibility (Miller 2007). Miller's main purpose is to undermine the global egalitarian argument that justice requires global equality of outcome or opportunity. Instead, he argues, like Walzer, that there is and ought to be a wide range of different conceptions and standards of justice between national societies. When it comes to the question of global poverty, Miller's basic contention is that where domestic institutions or practices are the cause of poverty those institutions ought to bear primary responsibility, and outsiders only insofar as they contribute to them (Miller 2007). In other words, there is no cosmopolitan responsibility to achieve global equality; instead, there are different national responsibilities to fulfil their own conception of justice. Here, he seems on pretty safe ground as no one would question this principle in itself, i.e., that nations like individuals must be responsible for the decisions they take and for things they have caused. Thus, like Rawls, Miller places responsibility for poverty alleviation primarily at the feet of nations. In addition, like Rawls, he endorses the empirical claim that it is likely that the domestic level is the most important cause of most famine and poverty (Miller 2007). By this, he means not

merely that corruption and so forth are causes of poverty, but also that bad judgement or imprudent economic policies might be morally relevant causes when it comes to remedial justice. In other words, if a country has made bad economic decisions that have led to poverty in its population, then outsiders have little responsibility for fixing this problem.⁴ Most importantly, however, he does make it explicit that institutions, like nations and the global institutional order, as well as individuals, must also be responsible for any harms they have caused abroad. Thus, where it can be shown that causes of poverty lie with the international order, a *prima facie* case exists that the order, or its most powerful states, be held responsible.

As noted, Miller also endorses a conception of global justice which is not egalitarian but which provides a global basic minimum in the form of basic rights. His argument is that, while individual nations have primary responsibility for ensuring that their members have their basic rights met, this obligation shifts to outsiders when they are unable or unwilling to do so. Thus, for instance, in a famine there are minimal cosmopolitan duties of alleviation. Miller also makes a distinction between what he calls humanitarian duties, which are non-binding, non-obligatory (charity), and duties of justice, which are obligatory. Miller rejects Rawls's reliance on mutual aid alone and instead wishes to acknowledge a universal duty to meet basic rights, which he describes as components of an account of global justice that is non-egalitarian. In other words, his account goes beyond recognition of 'natural duties'.

Nonetheless, Miller's account of basic rights is consistent with Rawls's view that the kind of duties required globally are minimal, temporary and remedial, rather than maximal, permanent and curative. Insofar as there are any global principles, they are 'non-distributive in character: they may . . . specify a minimum level of entitlement . . . (or) procedures that should govern relationships between political communities, such as principles of reciprocity or mutual aid' (Miller 2002: 976). Likewise, Walzer recognizes that 'at least one positive moral principle - mutual aid or good samaritanism - extends across political frontiers, specifying duties owed . . . to persons generally' (Walzer 1994: 3). Basic rights, at least in Miller's account, and mutual aid refer to non-distributive principles of assistance and do not address the basic structure.

In keeping with their communitarian starting point, those who reject the liberal solution argue that minimal principles of natural duties or 'natural justice' such as mutual aid are capable of addressing the worst aspects of global inequality and overcoming any failure to nations to fulfil their people's rights. These anti-cosmopolitan

accounts tend to associate the term cosmopolitanism with the case for distributive justice and almost exclusively with liberal Rawlsianism or global egalitarianism. For this reason, they tend not to describe 'natural duties' as cosmopolitan duties. However, these duties are clearly, as we have seen, owed to individuals everywhere, impartially, and are therefore cosmopolitan in the strict sense. The anti-cosmopolitan positions on global poverty are therefore best described as minimally cosmopolitan and anti-global egalitarianism.

Ultimately, given both Rawls's and Miller's minimal universalism, the debate between cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism in relation to global poverty rests on empirical questions over who can provide the best account of the causes of global poverty. Rawls's picture gets to the disagreement between cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitanism, which is between those who see the cause of poverty as ultimately domestic and those who see it as inextricably connected to and caused by, even if only in part, international or global circumstances.

The problems with Rawls's view are many, but, as has been suggested earlier, there are two that are particularly important. The first is that his assumption of, and argument for, a world of autonomous states with only minimal interaction does not reflect the reality of the world as it is; nor does it reflect necessarily a realizable or even desirable Utopia. Most importantly, it dismisses the possibility that interactions between communities can both bring benefits and cause morally significant harm, including poverty and starvation. Rawls simply wants to deny the existence of poverty as a *global* problem, conveying poverty as simply the sum total of national failures to successfully manage their economies and natural resources. Thus, as Miller acknowledges, if it can be shown that there are significant external causes of poverty the question of external responsibility is raised as well.

From natural duties to cosmopolitan justice

While many of the criticisms of a global egalitarianism have significant purchase, they do not amount to a case against cosmopolitanism per se, or against more substantive global obligations to help the destitute. At best, they reveal the global egalitarian solution as problematic. There are serious deficiencies as well with the more limited accounts of obligations that anti-cosmopolitans associate with communal autonomy and natural duties.

The following section, rather than examine the limitations of the anti-cosmopolitanism solution and Rawls's assumptions about bounded communities, examines what might follow from a cosmopolitan reading of the concessions that anti-cosmopolitans make to cosmopolitanism on the issue of global distributive justice. In other words, in relation to global poverty, what might natural duties require of us? Doing so reveals that even these limited duties can give rise to substantial cosmopolitan obligations, not only of beneficence but of justice as well. The following sections argue that significant cosmopolitan conclusions flow from the starting assumptions of anti-cosmopolitans when they recognize natural duties or basic rights. This section focuses on the doctrine of human rights, the duty of mutual aid and the duty not to harm or cause unnecessary suffering. It argues that these principles have been used by cosmopolitans to endorse substantial principles of global distributive justice in relation to the existence of global destitution. These duties require substantial efforts to end global poverty but without the drawbacks associated with the cosmopolitan Rawlsianism of Beitz et al. In particular, a number of cosmopolitan positions can be identified which do not have the same failings but which are compatible with anti-cosmopolitan arguments concerning communal autonomy, natural duties and the recognition of basic rights.

Human rights

While anti-cosmopolitans generally are sceptical about moral universalism, they nonetheless have more often than not endorsed a doctrine of basic human rights. For Rawls, respect for human rights was a criterion of a decent society and, as just noted, David Miller explicitly endorses Henry Shue's conception of basic rights as an account of global justice. What does such an endorsement mean when applied to the issue of global poverty? Within cosmopolitanism, we can identify a number of different human rights arguments that often overlap and come to similar conclusions. In these accounts, poverty, inequality and hunger are understood primarily as human rights violations.

If we defend the idea that all human beings have human rights, especially those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, then it clearly follows that those who suffer from severe poverty are suffering from human rights violations. Thomas Pogge argues poverty can be understood as a violation of human rights as enshrined in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

which states '[E]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the declaration can be fully realized.' The current international economic order constitutes a major violation of human rights because it contributes to the continuation of massive severe poverty. For Pogge (2002b: 164), the current order is clearly failing in this regard because the destitute are unable to realize their basic human rights.

One of the first attempts to spell out the human rights implications of global poverty was Henry Shue's *Basic Rights* where he argued that severe poverty and starvation are violations of basic rights. Basic rights represent 'everyone's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity' (Shue 1980: 19). These are basic or prior to other rights in the sense that they cannot be fulfilled or enjoyed until basic rights are achieved. According to Shue, there exist two basic rights: a right to security and a right to subsistence. Without a right to physical security or to subsistence, then it is impossible to enjoy any other right. One cannot enjoy a right to political liberty or freedom of expression if one is likely to be murdered or tortured, and has no legal protection from such abuse. Likewise, one cannot enjoy a right to vote if one has to spend all one's time in the search for basic subsistence. It is in this sense that these rights are basic. Basic rights are the condition of enjoyment of other rights. Clearly, severe poverty and starvation constitute violations of basic rights. Massive poverty and hunger on a global scale amount to a failure to meet basic rights to subsistence, which are universal human rights.

More importantly, Shue argues that such rights engender three correlating duties - 'duties to *avoid* depriving, duties to *protect* from deprivation, and duties to *aid* the deprived' (1980: 255). Therefore, there is a universal duty for those who are capable to aid the suffering, and to avoid depriving them of subsistence. This duty falls not just on states but on other actors, including corporations or the IMF. For example, the duty to avoid depriving is universal, and direct. Duties to aid come into place when other agents are unable or unwilling to do so. So, if a state is 'failing', the responsibility falls to outsiders or other agents who are capable of fulfilling it. In addition, Shue argues, 'clearly if duties to avoid depriving people of their last means of subsistence are to be taken seriously some provision must be made for enforcing this duty on behalf of the rest of humanity' (1980: 56). Cosmopolitans clearly argue that human rights generate human duties and that therefore the responsibility to address them is universal. According to Pogge, 'Human rights give persons moral claims not merely on the institutional order of their own societies, which are claims against their fellow citizens, but also on the global institutional

order which are claims against their fellow human beings' (2002b: 68).

Nevertheless, in the current international order, it is generally the duties of states to fulfil the rights of their citizens. This would suggest that the anti-cosmopolitans are correct that addressing poverty is a domestic concern. However, this leaves open the question of whose responsibility it is to fulfil those rights when the state in question cannot or will not do so. Does responsibility to uphold human rights extend to the international order or to specific other states?

Under-fulfilment of subsistence rights can have many causes, from bad government to natural disaster and so on, but given that institutional factors can play a part in all of these there is a duty to make sure that the institutions individuals are relying upon do not harm them and enable them to have their basic rights fulfilled. Thus, there is a duty to create an international institutional order that fulfils those rights. It may be that states are the best means for doing so, but if a particular state cannot do so, then the obligation falls on outsiders. It is the responsibility of all of us, therefore, to live up to the principles of international order to end global poverty. According to Shue, 'among the most important duties of individual persons will be indirect duties for the design and creation of positive-duty-performing institutions that do not yet exist and for the modification or transformation of existing institutions that now ignore rights and the positive duties that all rights involve' (1980: 703). In other words, there is something like Rawls's natural duty to create a just institutional basic structure.

Anti-cosmopolitans dispute the liberal cosmopolitan account of who has primary responsibility, but they do not reject international responsibility altogether. As Miller claims, 'we all to some degree share in the responsibility of ensuring that such rights are protected' (1999: 200; see also 2007). Thus, Miller argues that the existence of societies that fail to protect basic rights 'triggers our general obligation to support and aid other human beings regardless of political or cultural boundaries' (Miller 1999: 179). This includes 'injunctions to supply life-preserving resources to those who lack them when it is in your power to do so' (Miller 1999: 199). He also claims that in circumstances where there is absence of an effective political community and the existence of systematic violations of human rights, the obligation shifts directly 'onto the shoulders of outsiders' (Miller 1999: 201). Thus, if the nation-state is incapable or unwilling to uphold basic rights, the responsibility falls to other nation-states or the international community to do so.

Miller endorses the view also that sometimes there must be a

universal positive duty to intervene or help uphold the rights of those in other countries and not just a negative duty not to deny those rights. Indeed, as Caney notes, within Miller's scheme there are 'three principles of international distributive justice. These include a principle of human rights, a commitment to non-exploitation and a commitment to provide political communities with enough to be self-determining' (Caney 2001a: 981, citing Miller 2000: 174-8). However, the question for anti-cosmopolitans who do endorse human rights is whether they ought not to endorse the cosmopolitan arguments that extend from it as well.

The recognition of universal human rights complicates the anti-cosmopolitan position and leads to some apparently contradictory claims. In particular, it follows that there are significant global duties to aid the destitute and to create an international order that does not deprive them of their rights. Recognition of basic human rights as universal rights belonging to all people requires at least some commitment to a global distributive account, even if primary duties are allocated to specific sub-units, such as nations. Miller's response to this question is to argue that national responsibility puts limiting conditions upon global or cosmopolitan responsibilities beyond this minimum. Nonetheless, if human rights are indeed universal it follows that at least some universal obligations must also be entailed, otherwise they are by definition not universal rights, to be held against everyone, but only national or particular, to be upheld only against fellow nationals. Miller's position on this question seems to place him much more firmly in the cosmopolitan camp than he would like to admit.

Capabilities approach

An alternative, but also partially derivative, approach, focusing specifically on the problems of the global poor (and in particular on women) in the context of global development, is the so-called capabilities approach (see chapter 2). Moving beyond the basic or subsistence rights approach, focusing on the bare minimum for physical survival, the capabilities approach seeks to extend what it actually means to live a life worth living. The way to do this is to identify a cross-cultural consensus on a list of capabilities common to all humans that when fulfilled allow one to have and enjoy a good life that amounts to truly human functioning, without saying what that good life is or should be for everyone. Severe poverty and starvation

clearly represent an obstacle to a fully functioning human life. The truly poor are unable to either enjoy their life or to express their full potential. There is, therefore, an obligation upon everybody to create the conditions whereby successful human functioning can occur.

Nussbaum argues that the expression this sort of thinking takes in Singer-like utilitarianism leads to impractical and unreasonable demands on individuals. Instead, the main responsibility for meeting the entitlements of humans falls to institutions, both global and national, and to other agents like multinational corporations. Institutions must create the conditions in which individuals can realize the entitlements because 'justice is realized in multiple relations, in that responsibilities for promoting human capabilities are assigned to a wide range of distinct global and domestic structures' (Nussbaum 2007: 323).

In this way, Nussbaum is reaching out to Rawlsian ideas about the basic structure and a modified form of the social contract tradition. In her formulation, all those party to and affected by a social contract ought to be included in consideration, and included in such a way that their capabilities are realized. The capabilities approach emphasizes positive duties to meet this aim. According to Nussbaum (2002a), the capabilities approach is an entitlement and outcomes-oriented approach. By focusing on human beings' minimal entitlements it is derivative of rights-based thinking; however, by looking at outcomes it is also not entirely dissimilar to utilitarianism. Indeed, Nussbaum (2002a) claims it also focuses on those to whom harm is done rather than on those who do harm. The state, for instance, has not done enough if it is only committed to negative duties because meeting capabilities criteria requires 'affirmative shaping of the material and social environment ... to bring all citizens up to the threshold level' (Nussbaum 2002a: 133). The same applies to the international order, which has a duty to promote development policies which aim to meet these criteria. These duties extend across boundaries because our status as human beings means we owe these obligations universally and because we are enmeshed in a global social and economic web of interaction, or global basic structure, which impacts everybody's capacities and which currently denies the poor theirs. The capabilities approach has received some support from anti-cosmopolitans. However, Miller has been explicit in arguing that it has problems extending from its ever extending list of capabilities. He claims that the capabilities approach goes too far beyond the basic requirements of basic rights and ends up describing capabilities that might not be universalizable and that might violate national conceptions of justice.

Mutual aid and global justice: Singer

Without a doubt, the most far-reaching and persuasive, if not controversial, accounts of duties to address global poverty have been provided by the Australian utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer. Singer was also one of the first philosophers in recent times to take the issue of global poverty seriously (Singer 1972). At the core of Singer's case is the not uniquely utilitarian argument that mutual aid, the duty to help another when in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself, requires the rich to devote their excess income to relieving poverty in the rest of the world.

Singer argues that in the face of persistent global hunger and dire poverty, which leads to the avoidable death of millions every year, people in affluent countries are in a comparable position to someone watching a child drown in a pond for fear of getting their trousers wet. Singer states, 'if I am walking past a water pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing (1972: 231).⁵ Therefore, it follows that if we think it wrong to let the child die, then we ought also think it wrong to let millions die from preventable hunger and poverty. In turn, this means, knowing as we do that many people starve, we ought to consider ourselves morally obligated to help those distant foreigners before we help less needy fellow nationals or spend money on ourselves.

What follows from this argument is a prescription for action, stating that individuals and families in well-off countries ought to give all the money left over after paying for necessities to alleviate third world poverty. In this vein, according to Singer, 'each one of us with wealth surplus to his or her essential needs should be giving most of it to help people suffering from poverty so dire as to be life-threatening' (2002: 12). People in affluent countries, and presumably in affluent sections of poor countries, are morally obligated to help those who are in danger of losing their lives, and if they do not they should not consider themselves to be leading morally defensible lives. Singer argues, 'Those who do not meet this standard should be seen as failing to meet their fair share of global responsibility and therefore as doing something that is seriously morally wrong' (2002: 12).

The moral principle that Singer draws from this analogy is mutual aid, though he does not call it such. According to Singer:

If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance we ought, morally, to do it... I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. (1972: 231)

It is also worth noting that the duty to aid others is not affected by anything other than their need. Singer's argument does not draw upon any relation of interdependence or fault, but only upon the premise that there is global poverty and there is global wealth, and there is a capacity for one to end the other. National boundaries, causes and history have no place in his moral reasoning. The Bugatti driver and the man with wet clothes were not related to the children they did or did not save; nor did they know anything about them other than that their life was in peril. Whether the children were Muslim, animist, or even children of terrorists, was completely immaterial. It is only their situation of need, and the observer's capacities to act that were morally relevant. Likewise, whether a child's poverty is a result of some historical legacy is not a morally relevant factor, because the child's need is nonetheless real and to let the child die, say, because perhaps it fell into the pond rather than was pushed, would be wrong. In other words, this is a duty owed to others as people per se without qualification, a natural, though not perfect, duty.

Singer acknowledges that his position might appear too morally demanding but that this does not detract from his moral position. It simply means that it is hard to be moral. As presented, the argument sounds overwhelming in that very extensive obligations fall upon the globally wealthy. This appears even more so when it is remembered that Singer's utilitarianism demands that the wealthy give up to the point of marginal utility. That is, up to the point at which the rich would begin to be harmed, to reduce themselves to a similarly desperate situation. This is not required by utilitarianism, but what is morally prescribed is to give till it is about to hurt. This means in turn that by continuing to spend large amounts of our income on non-essential and luxury items, such as expensive restaurants, upgrading a television set or keeping up with fashions, we are withholding aid to the needy. That is, we could go without, the equivalent of getting our clothes muddy, without incurring a significant harm to ourselves while dramatically increasing the life spans and life chances of hundreds if not thousands of people who otherwise might starve to death. If we are to withhold this money

and continue to spend it on luxury items, we then value 'luxury' items above human life.

In the abstract, this does indeed sound demanding and very few people would consider this a just solution (see Arneson 2004). However, it could also be claimed that, given the actual distribution of wealth in the global economy, if the policy were followed it would not take long at all to eradicate poverty. In other words, the rich would only have to surrender a very small amount of their wealth to fulfil their moral duty. This is especially so if it is remembered that Singer's concern is not with global equality but with alleviating destitution and starvation.

However, if we can assume, as Singer does, that most people will not exercise their positive duty to help the poor, then that leaves us with the problem of how global poverty might be ended and whose responsibility it is, and how that responsibility might be met. If we assume that there will not be a large surge in affluent societies' willingness to sacrifice their luxuries, then we must ask what other means are available. Singer, along with many others, also acknowledges that while we as individuals have certain responsibilities, our political institutions and NGOs all have responsibilities as well. There is no inherent contradiction in utilitarianism pursuing this route because utilitarians may be pragmatic regarding the agent of beneficence. Obligations to help the poor fall on whoever can or will do it most efficiently. While we as individuals ought to do whatever we can, this does not relieve states of similar duties. In addition, Singer does not completely deny the importance of causal responsibility, but such responsibility only compounds the duty of mutual aid which exists before any such 'social' relations (Singer 2002).

The most immediate apparent difference between rights approaches and Singer's utilitarianism is in their understanding of what it is about poverty that makes it a moral problem. For utilitarians, it is because poverty is a cause of suffering, whereas, for rights thinkers, poverty is a denial of rights, including a condition whereby individuals can enjoy their higher-order rights. In other words, suffering per se is not the moral motivation; instead, a particular form of harm, the violation of rights, is the source of concern. While measuring or assessing the degree of suffering is a problem for utilitarian theories, an exclusive focus on rights seems also to miss something very important about why poverty should concern us. We do not always think of ourselves first and foremost as rights bearers, but as people capable of suffering, and for most people that is the first thing that strikes us about severe poverty - that people suffer from it, not that their rights have been denied. While rights talk is powerful in legal terms and is increasingly

seen as a de facto universal moral language, it has limitations in terms of its capacity to speak to what is perhaps most common to us as humans, which is our capacity to suffer.

One of the most important criticisms of Singer's approach, and indeed of any appeal to mutual aid, is that it has the suggestion of charity about it. Although Singer makes it clear that giving to poverty relief is not optional, but a moral obligation, it still comes across that he is claiming the 'solution' to global poverty is one of individual sacrifice and personal ethics (see Kuper 2002; and Singer's response). One of the problems with his approach, and one reason why many cosmopolitans think the appeal to mutual aid is insufficient, is that it directs attention away from the political and institutional causes of poverty and suffering. Miller also claims that failing to take account of national responsibility would lead to counter-productive policies (Miller 2007: 231). Anti-cosmopolitans, on the whole, as noted above, think this is sufficient at the international level because they choose to believe that poverty is primarily a domestic concern and not a result of the global basic structure. However, there are good reasons for thinking that there are significant global and international causes of global poverty that give rise to significant duties of justice. One way to see this is to begin not with asking whether the international order is egalitarian, but whether and in what ways it is harmful. That is, with the natural duty to do no harm.

Harm and global poverty

So far, we have discussed the positive duties of mutual aid or beneficence and the idea of basic human rights. The third of Rawls's natural duties is the negative duty to do no harm, including the duty to avoid causing unnecessary suffering. This section presents the argument that the harm principle, in the context of the contemporary global economy, generates a significant duty to eradicate severe global poverty and destitution. The duty to do no harm allows a defence for limiting the harms done to other communities via international economic arrangements, which is consistent with a plurality of conceptions of justice and which would go a long way to meeting the challenge of serious global inequality. According to Linklater, the universality of the harm principle extends from:

two universal features of human existence: first, all human beings are susceptible to particular (though not identical) forms of mental and physical

pain [. . .] second, shared (though unequal) vulnerability to mental and bodily harm gives all human beings good reason to seek the protection of a harm principle. (2006: 20)

Recognition of the duty to do no harm at its simplest means that 'our' economic well-being cannot come at the expense of the survival or suffering of outsiders. It means we must recognize the possibility that in 'the desire to do the best for our fellow citizens . . . we collude in imposing unacceptable costs on outsiders' (Linklater 2002a: 150). In other words, whatever the condition of our domestic social contract, we cannot consider it legitimate if it imposes unnecessary suffering or harm on those not party to it.

As we noted earlier, for the critics of cosmopolitan justice the question of cause or blame is directly related to responsibility. In this vein, the problems of the poor are not the fault of the rich and therefore there is only a limited, humanitarian, duty to help. Rawls argued that most of the fault lies with corrupt governments, traditional beliefs, civil wars or other problems internal to poor countries.

However, unlike Rawls, both Miller and Walzer accept that the harm principle has some bearing on the questions of global distributive justice, and in particular the question of global poverty. For both these authors, the anti-cosmopolitan or communitarian starting point does not rule out recognition of harm-based obligations in relation to global poverty. This acknowledgement extends potentially from their recognition of the natural duty to do no harm. Thus, implicit in Walzer's position on refugees and membership, is an acknowledgement that states bear responsibility for harm they commit outside their borders. As Jones argues, in relation to Walzer's points, 'global inequalities of wealth resources and living standards are unjust only if those inequalities have been brought about by external intervention in the internal affairs of some otherwise properly self-determining group, nation, or country' (1999: 197). Therefore, it should follow that poverty that can be considered to have been caused by 'outsiders' is a moral concern for those outsiders. It is the responsibility of those outsiders to help address the harms they have caused.

Likewise, Miller (2004a, 2007) suggests that a principle of non-exploitation between countries is compatible with nationalist principles of distribution. It follows, then, that the only objection to a global harm principle that anti-cosmopolitans can make is to claim that only morally significant causes of poverty are domestic. However this is an empirical claim and not a normative/ethical one. As Beitz argues, 'if the determinants of a society's level of well-being

are internal and non-economic, then concern about the international distribution ... might appear to be pointless' (1999: 524).⁶ However, if it can be shown the wealthy states are collectively responsible for an economic order which harms the poor by causing or perpetuating their poverty, then there are no reasons from a communitarian starting point for rejecting obligations to reform this order.

Clearly, in order to make this case, it must first be demonstrated how and in what ways the rich harm the poor. The most important question, then, is to examine this empirical claim and to see what ethical considerations follow from it. In this manner, an account of global justice that is going to be persuasive beyond an appeal to mutual aid might need to establish some causal relationship between 'their poverty' and our 'affluence'. This section discusses how the harm principle is employed by Thomas Pogge in the context of global poverty to demonstrate that the rich and powerful countries of the world owe a significant duty of global justice to the poorest.

According to Pogge, regardless of the lack of a common culture or 'global society', there are relationships of dominance, dependence and inequality present in the international sphere that are unjust to perpetuate. The wealthiest states in the world have imposed and continue to impose an economic order that disadvantages the poorest: 'there is an injustice in the economic scheme, which it would be wrong for more affluent participants to perpetuate. And that is so quite independently of whether we and the starving are united by a communal bond or committed to sharing resources with one another' (2001a: 97). Unlike Beitz, Pogge does not assume that the international order can be characterized as a system of mutual advantage. In particular, Pogge argues, we participate in common institutional structures such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank. Furthermore, the global economy is not a system for mutual advantage, but rather it is one of domination whereby certain practices are imposed by some on others. It is the nature of the relationship that creates the circumstances of justice via a negative duty.

The main point is that we have duties to others regardless of whether we are engaged in an activity of mutual advantage: we have (natural) negative duties not to impose harms and to redress the harms we have inflicted. This generates a negative duty on the part of the rich to cease harming the poor. Even if we disagree upon what a just world order would look like, we can agree that the present international order is unjust, and that there is a responsibility to make it more just.

Whose fault is it?

So, in what ways are the rich engaged in a causally negative relationship with the poor? According to Pogge, the question concerns not only simple causation but a number of contributory factors and 'morally relevant' connections between the rich and poor.

Pogge identifies three such connections which are not simply causal but which nonetheless contribute to the existence and persistence of poverty:

First, their social starting positions and ours have emerged from single historical process that was pervaded by massive grievous wrongs. The same historical injustices including genocide, colonialism, and slavery, play a role in explaining both their poverty and our affluence. Second, they and we depend on a single natural resource base, from the benefits of which they are largely, and without compensation, excluded. The affluent countries and the elites of the developing world divided these resources on mutually agreeable terms, without leaving 'enough and as good' for the remaining majority of humankind. Third they and we coexist within a single global economic order that has a strong tendency to perpetuate and even to aggravate global economy inequality. (2001b: 14)

The legacy of the past is to have left former colonies worse off than they might have been and left former colonial powers better off. The rich have benefited from past crimes and continue to do so, while the poor have suffered as a result and continue to do so. In that sense, there is an obligation to repair or at least to address the damage done and to acknowledge a debt that has been accrued. In addition, the current international inequality is not disconnected from the past but is in fact a direct result of former policies that favoured the wealthy and powerful. According to Pogge, 'most of the existing international inequality in standards of living was built up in the colonial period when today's affluent countries ruled today's poor regions of the world: trading their people like cattle, destroying their political institutions and cultures and taking their natural resources' (2001b: 9). Thus, past exploitation and injustice have a direct bearing upon the present conditions, and obligations are owed to either, at least, repair the damage done or to compensate for the unequal 'starting point'. Pogge concludes that under a negative duties conception 'upholding a radical inequality counts as harming the worse-off when the historical path on this inequality arose is pervaded by grievous wrongs' (2001b: 10). In defending the status quo we are causing a harm, and this is aggravated by our privileged position in the status quo which is the result of past wrongs.

This essentially cosmopolitan point is not inconsistent with the accounts of justice given by Miller and Walzer who endorse the principle that past injustices do raise duties of responsibility. Miller argues that exploitation is a form of unjustifiable harm and that 'many existing inequalities are likely to be the result of past exploitation of the poor countries by rich countries ... so they will be unjust' (1999: 207). Walzer, for instance, states that the past practices may provide the basis for a global effort to address poverty and that 'a strong critique of global inequalities and a persuasive claim that we are obligated to help the poorest countries can be derived from an historical account of how the world economy developed' (2003b). In making this recognition, they both go further than Rawls who seems to maintain that past injustices are irrelevant, or do not exist. However, where they agree with Rawls is in their rejection of global egalitarianism as providing the criteria and means of addressing injustice.

While historical contributions may be less controversial, the extent to which the current global economic order causes greater inequality is a matter of some debate.⁷ Many argue that the poor are benefiting under globalization and some anti-cosmopolitans argue that even under 'globalization', responsibility for causing and addressing poverty remains primarily domestic.

However, against the explanatory nationalism of Rawls and Miller, Pogge identifies two ways in which the current international order contributes to global destitution. The first is direct and the second indirect. The direct contribution is the degree to which the global order directs resources and wealth away from the poor and prevents them from accessing it. The second is the degree to which the global political economic order reinforces corrupt practices and governments. Pogge makes a case that the two are intimately connected. Rather than promoting free trade across the board, the WTO is geared in favour of the rich countries by imposing unfair protectionist measures that discriminate against the poorest countries. Pogge's argument is that the WTO has made things worse for very many people:

In the WTO negotiations, the affluent countries insisted on continued and asymmetrical protections of their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export credits, and subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export opportunities of even the very poorest countries. These protections cost developing countries hundreds of billions of dollars in lost export revenues ... and certainly account for a sizable fraction of the 270 million poverty related deaths since 1989. (2002a: 21)

The rich countries could have chosen a different set of rules that didn't actively discriminate against the poor. So, even if the old regime was bad, the new regime is also bad and is worse than it ought to have been. Under the WTO regimes, quotas and protectionist measures were lower between the rich countries than between the rich and poorer countries. As a result, Pogge (2002a: 18) argues that 'Millions who would have lived had the old regime continued have in fact died from poverty related causes. These people were killed, and others harmed in other ways, by the change over to the new regime.' The point is that this harm was avoidable and that rich countries could have agreed to less 'burdensome' rules for the rest of the world.

Under the current system, the poor are not doing well enough, and they would do better under a feasible alternative system. Therefore, even if the poor are better off, they are not better off enough because they remain in avoidable poverty. Even though global institutions may not directly be the major cause, they can nonetheless play a major role in alleviating the problem. Therefore, given that something like the duty of mutual aid demands that if we can help another without significant cost to ourselves then we ought to, the rules of global trade can be changed to help the poor escape their poverty and there is a duty on the part of those with the power to do so. Pogge is not necessarily claiming that the institutional order is the *main* cause of world poverty, but that most severe poverty worldwide 'was and is avoidable through global institutional reforms' (2002a: 19).

As we have seen, Rawls argues that third world poverty must be attributed to national level decisions and determinants. This can include everything from domestic corruption to poor management. However, Pogge shows that this is not the end of the story because the international system or rules of international order, and especially rules of international finance, provide incentives to undemocratic and corrupt governments. Whatever domestic causes there may be for poverty and starvation, they cannot be understood in the absence of the global institutional scheme in which they sit. In the words of Pogge, 'an adequate explanation of persistent global poverty must not merely adduce the prevalence of flawed institutional regimes and of corrupt, oppressive, incompetent elites in the poor countries, but must also provide an explanation for this prevalence' (2001b: 45). That is, it must establish the reason why there are so many poorly run, corrupt, non-accountable governments in the world and the extent to which the international order permits, encourages or does not seek to prevent the emergence of these governments.

Pogge (2002a) identifies two institutional supports that the international order provides corrupt and undemocratic states, including

international resources and international borrowing privileges. The first of these refers to the right of states, once they are deemed sovereign, to sell natural assets on the world market. In the case of non-democratic regimes, this is the equivalent of selling stolen property and provides an incentive to corrupt or tyrannical actors to seize control of the state so that they can acquire the benefits of selling that property. This sort of action is perfectly legal in the international realm while illegal domestically.

Likewise, the borrowing privilege refers to the right of any sovereign government to borrow against its natural assets. This effectively allows access to global economic resources, regardless of the nature of the regimes. Again, this provides an incentive to corrupt or non-democratic actors to seize control of the state. The point here is that in both these practices the international order provides a condition of possibility and does not punish behaviour that encourages corruption and is therefore a contributing factor to global poverty.

Pogge's account of poverty is an institutional account rather than an interactional one. The interactional account says moral cosmopolitanism flows from our understanding of what is owed to persons *qua* persons. Singer's utilitarian argument is an interactional account, as it does not rely logically and morally on any causal connection or institutional relationship between the affluence of some parts of the world and the poverty of others. On the other hand, the institutional account emphasizes that justice is an institutional practice and we owe duties of justice to those we affect through our institutional relationships. In this way, Pogge's approach is Rawlsian because it looks at the effects of the basic institutional structure in relationships between states, without relying upon a claim about mutual advantage.

In this context, Pogge emphasizes the *harmful* relationship between the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor. The rich have a duty to help the poor because the international order, which they largely created, is a major cause of world poverty. Such a duty is 'not . . . a merely positive responsibility . . . , like Rawls's duty of assistance, but a negative responsibility to stop imposing the existing global order and to prevent and mitigate the harms it continually causes for the world's poorest populations' (2001b: 22). The rich countries are collectively responsible for about 18 million deaths from poverty annually: 'the citizens and governments of the wealthy societies, by imposing the present global economic order, significantly contribute to the persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional moral responsibility for it' (2001b: 57). The rules of the system, and the basic structure of international society, actively damage or

disadvantage certain sectors of the economy, thereby directly contradicting Rawlsian principles of justice. Thus, Pogge claims:

because we are . . . implicated . . . in shaping and enforcing the social institutions that produce these deprivations, and are . . . benefiting from the enormous inequalities these unjust institutions reproduce, we have . . . stringent duties to seek to reform these social institutions and to do our fair share toward mitigating the harms they cause. (2002a: 7)

Therefore, given that an international economic order which causes harms exists now, there are good reasons to accept that certain universal rules ought to be devised to limit, redress, alleviate or eradicate such harm and to prevent it in the future.

This latter point is important because it suggests that, even if the current order is not entirely to blame for persistent starvation, it still has to justify the contribution it does make and why any alternative is not feasible (Pogge 2002a: 44). Again, Miller endorses such an approach when he condemns exploitation and unfair terms of trade and asks 'how an international economic order can be created in which opportunities for exploitation be minimized and . . . that constrains the actions of potential exploiters' (1999: 208). On this point, Miller only disagrees with Pogge over the extent of the international obligation but not over its presence (Miller 2007: 240-50).

There is, then, a minimal obligation on the rich to engineer a global international order that improves, or at least does not harm, the worst off. The current international order, which is largely the creation of the most powerful and wealthy states, actively disadvantages and harms the poor and prevents the eradication of poverty. Those who gain most from the current economic order have an obligation to change it in such a way that the most needy benefit. First and foremost, the current rules of international trade discriminate against the poor and, given its inequalities, there is a duty to reform the existing rules of international trade. The current rules of international trade discriminate against the poor by subsidizing the rich and blocking access to imports from the poorest countries. Global justice demands that rich countries, such as Australia, should open their markets to the poorer countries. Pogge (2005a: 197) also argues that they can do so without causing disproportionate harm to the rich. The resource rights and global lending rights should be withdrawn from illegitimate governments, and a natural resources dividend paid to the poor.

Pogge's argument demonstrates that the 'do no harm' principle, when applied to relationships between political communities and globally, reveals the current world economic order to be very

harmful indeed to many. The 'do no harm' principle, when seen through a cosmopolitanism lens, reveals poverty to be never just a national problem but a global one also. There is, then, even on 'anti-cosmopolitan' grounds, a significant duty to cease harming the global poor that requires significant reform of the international order. In other words, there are significant cosmopolitanism responsibilities for global justice that flow from the natural duty of 'do no harm'.

Pogge's institutional account, while persuasive, is also incomplete because it only addresses the issue of institutional harm and suggests that there is little or no role for individual beneficence. While it is clearly incumbent upon the rich to reform the world economic order, this may take some time and in the meantime millions will die. As Pogge himself notes, this is a morally horrific situation. For any cosmopolitan response, simply letting millions die while waiting for structural reform neglects those people's status as ends. How, then, should we understand the relationship between justice and beneficence, or mutual aid? The following section makes it clear that these two principles should never have been separated, and instead when understood from a Kantian position are the basis of a coherent cosmopolitan approach to global poverty.

Kant: from beneficence to justice and back again

In contrast to rights-based and utilitarian positions, Onora O'Neill (1986) argues that a Kantian ethic of universal obligations based on a principle of non-coercion provides both a more effective and also a more just means of addressing the moral problem of hunger and starvation. Rights-based and contractarian approaches have two major flaws, according to her. Contractarianism, by which she means Rawlsianism, is based on too idealized a conception of agency. Rawls's social contract, based on the hypothetical original position, requires an account of human beings that robs them of essential human qualities. The peoples situated behind a veil of ignorance are unrecognizable as real people and are simply 'types'. The Rawlsian conclusion, therefore, will be too abstract and unpersuasive to those who do not understand or share this view. Its level of abstraction from recognizable human beings (i.e., those not situated behind a veil of ignorance) precludes its accessibility to real human beings.

Rights-based approaches are criticized for also having an unnecessarily idealized concept of agency and a bias towards the claimants of rights, and not enough to say about who has the obligation to fulfil

those rights. In terms of those with the power and ability to effect change, according to O'Neill, 'rights discourse often carries only a vague message to those whose action is needed to secure respect for rights' (1986: 117). Rights, in other words, are only half the story. They provide an incomplete moral framework and are inadequate for both practical and ethical reasons as a means of addressing global hunger.

Utilitarianism, on the other hand, while speaking the everyday language of suffering, suffers from making mutual aid the entirety of justice. Under Singer's conception, mutual aid as the individual's duty to help becomes the entire solution to poverty and hunger. This is also a mistake because it does not understand the relationship between beneficence and justice. This relationship is best understood by Kant and articulated in the Kantian tradition. The Kantian approach understands that the duty of mutual aid arises in part because of failings of justice. An unjust world will have more call for mutual aid. However, this is no substitute for 'the institutional conditions which systemically meet material needs and guarantee the absence of coercion and deception' (O'Neill 1986: 146). In other words, mutual aid is no substitute for a just basic structure.

O'Neill argues that what is needed is a (non-utilitarian) theory of human obligations, a theory of fundamental morality which designates whose responsibility it is to address the problems of hunger and starvation and which understands the relationship between the duty to aid and the duty of justice. Thus, O'Neill argues, Kant provides the best response to the problems of global poverty. The CI, we recall, declares that our primary moral obligation is to treat others as ends in themselves. For O'Neill, this means to recognize their capacity of morally autonomous agency, rather than, say, guaranteeing a share of material wealth, though material needs must be met in order to realize our agency. Ultimately, the existence of starvation and hunger are grievous breaches of this obligation.

O'Neill argues that there are at least two maxims which fulfil the criteria of the categorical imperative and they give rise to both perfect and imperfect duties, duties of justice and duties of beneficence. The duty of beneficence, as we have already noted, requires that if others are in need, or need help in order to achieve effective autonomy, then there exists an obligation on the part of those without need to help and develop the talents needed to actualize autonomy in others. As we have seen, for Kant, mutual aid was required in cases where a person's moral capacity to act was impaired by undue suffering or deprivation such as poverty or destitution. As Herman states, 'respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty

of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others [their capacity to set and act for ends] when they are unable to do so without help' (1984: 597). This means there are both positive and negative duties to aid those whose agency is not being actualized and to refrain from coercion and deception in relations with others. In the words of O'Neill, 'Kantian beneficence supplies help needed if they are unable to act . . . Kantian development of talents supplies skills and capacities . . . that are needed for autonomous action' (1986: 146).

Beneficence, however, is not justice. The other rule to be taken from the CI is a more public rule of non-coercion and non-deception. According to O'Neill, the 'central demand of Kantian justice is negative: that actions, policies and situations not be based on or confirm to fundamental principles of coercion or deception' (1986: 146). In other words, do no harm. Coercion and deceit are violations of the agency of others and therefore constitute a denial of the others as ends in themselves. For O'Neill, 'Justice is embodied in public institutions and policies which secure freedom from deep forms of coercion and deception' (1986: 146). The Kantian response to poverty and hunger 'would begin with ways of organizing both production and distribution to meet needs, including material needs, which destroy capacities or power to act autonomously' (O'Neill 1986: 149).

As Pogge powerfully demonstrates, the current political order rests on structures of interaction which do rely on inequality, coercion and deception: 'The present international economic order is patently an institutional structure whose normal operation does not eliminate coercion or deception but often institutionalize them. It also standardly fails to respect, or to provide the help or development of talents needed for lives that can include autonomous action' (O'Neill 1986: 145). The application of a Kantian ethic would necessarily require a large-scale and thorough transformation of existing social-economic arrangements across the globe, 'a just global economic and political order would then have to be one designed to meet material needs . . . It would be embodied in economic and political structures which do not institutionalize coercion or deception and so respect rationality and autonomy in the vulnerable forms in which they are actually found' (O'Neill 1986: 149).

Not much has been said in this chapter about the foundational problem of global pluralism identified in the introduction. However, it is possible to identify and somewhat substantiate the claim made earlier that the Kantian approach overcomes the objections to cosmopolitanism on the ground of global pluralism. Put simply, there is little in the Kantian account that suggests the solution to global

poverty requires the imposition of a single determinant version of distributive justice or the good. Instead, it requires only that the political institutions of the day do not systemically harm those affected by them and that aid be given to those who need help when they are harmed or otherwise in need.

The significance of the Kantian approach is that it demonstrates that the 'natural duties' of no harm and mutual aid actually generate and are core parts of a cosmopolitan account of global justice. This account is neither Rawlsian nor utilitarian, but Kantian, and as such has significant advantages over them.

For instance, any solution to global poverty - including any rewriting of the rules of international order - must be agreeable to those affected by it. In that fashion, there is a responsibility on the part of the rich not only to cease the current harms but also to prevent future harms or problems that might arise in the redrafting of the rules of international economic life. Furthermore, they must not compound their harms by excluding the interests and arguments of the poor. Therefore, the solution must not be imposed without the consultation and agreement of the poorest people and their representatives.

Nowhere in this solution is the prospect of imposing a particular account of the good upon others raised as an option. Instead, the opposite is true: the rich have an obligation to cease imposing an unjust institutional order on the poor. It should also be noted that the dialogic component of harm avoidance helps to overcome the objections that not all harms trigger obligations, in particular, that some suffering is 'self-incurred' or purely a domestic responsibility (Miller), or that lines of causation are too diffuse or hard to determine. The cosmopolitan harm principle begins with the harms that states have imposed, that is, harms which have not been consented to by those who are harmed.

Corresponding to the duty to not harm is a positive duty to consult outsiders about any issue which may have harmful effects upon them, in order to assess whether it does constitute a harm, whether it is acceptable or not, and where responsibility lies. As Pogge's arguments about the role played by the global economic order in contributing to global poverty demonstrate, there are very few instances where responsibility is purely domestic because all domestic policy is conducted within a global context as well. So, for instance, if a population in one country experiences hunger or severe poverty it may be due to any number of factors, including domestic mismanagement (or worse), or it may be due largely to external factors attributable to one or a diffuse range of sources. Under these circumstances, there is a good case that before responsibility for harm can be determined all

parties who may reasonably be thought to be contributing to the situation in some measure have a responsibility to consult each other to assess the lines of causation and the proportion of responsibility born by each. While this is a morally demanding implication of the harm principle, it is one that buttresses the rights of independent communities, even while limiting their absolute freedom of action.

Conclusion

This chapter began by arguing that the most important issue raised by global poverty is that of moral responsibility. It was also claimed that global poverty presented a fundamental challenge to anti-cosmopolitanism. At the same time, it was argued that cosmopolitan approaches to poverty had been dominated by considerations of distributive justice and global egalitarianism, based on Rawls.

However, while some important differences exist, there is significant agreement over the responsibility for global hunger and starvation. The arguments above suggest an agreement that there are both 'national' or particular responsibilities, as well as global institutional and individual or universal responsibilities for ending global poverty. As Pogge's arguments about the role played by the global economic order in contributing to global poverty demonstrate, there are very few instances where responsibility is purely domestic, because all domestic policy is conducted within a global context as well.

In addition, the chapter showed that, when it comes to addressing the problem of global poverty, cosmopolitan positions and anti-cosmopolitan positions also agree about the following things:

- Global poverty is a significant moral problem.
- There are global duties of mutual aid to address severe poverty and destitution.
- These duties are owed to individuals and extend from what we owe to each other as persons.
- These duties may be mediated by a variety of institutions including states.
- Under certain circumstances if states or local institutions are unable to fulfil these duties then the international community or other states have responsibility to fulfil them.
- Obligations to the poor also extend from harms which may have arisen in specific causal relationships both historically and in the past. That is, there is a duty to redress harm that extends across borders.

- There is also a duty to significantly reform the current international order which extends from the harm that it does to the poorest.

What the areas of agreement demonstrate is that once the idea of natural duties has been accepted and it is clear that national or communal loyalties do not override natural duties, then differences can be understood as disagreement about the nature and extent of cosmopolitan principles but not on their desirability. In addition, the implication of this argument is that cosmopolitan solutions, understood in the broad sense, to global poverty do not require the type of homogenous political community envisaged by the anti-cosmopolitans, and can be reconciled with a world formally divided into separate political communities so long as those communities understand themselves to be bound by both national and cosmopolitan duties owed to humanity.

In sum, the chapter has argued that the specific problem of global poverty, or destitution, rather than of inequality, is amenable to other cosmopolitan solutions. In particular, it has argued that the most persuasive accounts of cosmopolitanism, which do not suffer the limitations of global Rawlsianism, are in fact extensions of the natural duties of mutual aid and do no harm. There are two implications of this argument. The first is that the anti-cosmopolitanism argument against global egalitarianism does not undermine the cosmopolitan position *per se*. The second is that it confirms the cosmopolitan presuppositions of the anti-cosmopolitan appeal to natural duties. Third, natural duties themselves generate significant duties of global distributive justice in the context of global poverty.