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Terrorism and War

> We stand, therefore, at the parting of the ways. Whether we find the way of peace or continue along the old road of brute force, so unworthy of our civilization, depends on ourselves.
>
> —Albert Einstein[1]

Introduction

Most people understand terrorism and war well enough for ordinary discourse, but both concepts need clarification to understand fully the moral issues they raise. We'll define them, and then explore the just war theory, which is the main theory people appeal to in trying to justify war. Terrorism often involves intentionally killing innocent people, and war inevitably kills innocent people, if only unintentionally. We'll ask whether such killing can be justified, as well as whether the intentional killing of soldiers in warfare can be justified. Warists (those who hold that war can be morally justified) believe that the intentional killing of soldiers is justified and that the killing of innocents can be excused if it's unintentional. Pacifists (those who believe that war, at least in the modern world, cannot be justified) deny both claims. We'll clarify the pacifist position and conclude by considering possible common ground between pacifists and warists.

15.1 The problem

The September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon stunned the world and left Americans feeling threatened as never before. The United States responded by launching an open-ended "war" against

terrorism, attacking Afghanistan and Iraq. A full assessment of these events isn't possible here, but a starting point is to try to understand better the two notions they center about: *terrorism* and *war*.

The common association of terror with cunning, deceit, and violence highlights the fact that violence is at the heart of terrorism. Violence that maintains the status quo (whether in the way of police action or war) tends to be approved by those who are its beneficiaries; that which threatens the status quo tends to be condemned. But the mode of violence that is almost universally condemned is terrorism. Although it's at the other end of the scale of destructiveness from nuclear war, terrorism rivals nuclear war in the dread it inspires.

15.2 What is terrorism?

The term "terrorism" is often used emotively, to stand for virtually any use of political violence of which we disapprove. (See Theory Box 1A, Chapter 1, Section 1.3, on emotive and descriptive meaning.) One and the same person is a terrorist or a freedom fighter, depending upon whether we approve or disapprove of his cause.

It's tempting to define terrorism in such a way that it's wrong by definition. When many people speak of terrorism, they mean by it something approximating the following:

Definition Box 15A

A Persuasive Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism$_1$: The merciless killing of innocent people for evil ends.

Definitions of this sort have been called evaluative or persuasive. In this case, the definition is evaluative because the moral assessment of terrorism has already been included in the definition, and it's persuasive because such a definition would normally be intended to convince others to share that assessment. You can't acknowledge that something is an act of terrorism without already condemning it as morally wrong. Thus from

1. X is an instance of terrorism,

it would follow:

2. Therefore X is morally wrong.

But terrorism has an underlying descriptive meaning, one that may point to a moral evaluation but which doesn't entail it in the way in which the above definition does. To terrorize is to instill extreme fear. Although this can be done for its own sake, terrorism becomes of moral and political interest when it causes and manipulates fear for a purpose. So understood, it can be defined as:

Definition Box 15B

A Descriptive Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism$_2$: Pursuit of one's ends by causing fear, usually by the use or threat of violence, often against innocent persons.

According to this second definition, one can acknowledge that something is an instance of terrorism but still consider it an open question whether it's morally justified. Thus from

1. X is an instance of terrorism,

one can still intelligibly ask (in a way in which one cannot with the first definition):

2. Is X morally permissible?

We'll proceed on the assumption that the moral evaluation of terrorism is best not decided by definition. This doesn't preclude any moral issues from consideration in connection with terrorism; it just moves them outside of the definition. So, by "terrorism" we shall henceforth mean *terrorism$_2$*.

According to this definition, who does the terrorizing doesn't matter. What counts is what is done and why. Individuals acting alone can terrorize. But so can groups, governments, or armies. And what the ends are doesn't matter. They may be social, political, religious, or moral. What makes one a terrorist are the means by which ends are pursued, not the ends themselves. One can terrorize in the service of just causes as well as unjust causes.

15.3 Rationalizations of terrorism

Terrorism is most important to understand when undertaken for a cause. For terrorism isn't necessarily a less rational choice—purely in the sense of being a perceived means to an end—than many conventionally accepted modes of violence.[2] The revolutionary Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) saw this when writing of the Russian revolution.

Key Quote 15A

A victorious war, Trotsky observed, usually destroys "only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands."[3]

Although Trotsky was describing the terror used by a revolutionary class, what he said applies to terrorism of any sort. Terrorism typically kills few people by comparison with warfare. That may change if terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical/biological weapons. Philanthropist Bill Gates warns of the dangers of bioterrorism in particular at a 2017 Munich Security Conference:

Bioterrorism and Pandemics

The point is, we ignore the link between health security and international security at our peril. Whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, epidemiologists say a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year. And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such an outbreak in the next 10–15 years … The good news is that with advances in biotechnology, new vaccines and drugs can help prevent epidemics from spreading out of control. And, most of the things we need to do to protect against a naturally occurring pandemic are the same things we must prepare for an intentional biological attack … I view the threat of deadly pandemics right up there with nuclear war and climate change … When the next pandemic strikes, it could be another catastrophe in the annals of the human race. Or it could be something else altogether. An extraordinary triumph of human will. A moment when we prove yet again that, together, we

are capable of taking on the world's biggest challenges to create a safer, healthier, more stable world.[4]

Whatever the scale of violence represented by terrorism, it instills fear, and typically tries to manipulate that fear to achieve the ends of those who use it.

Often it's not known what the justification for terrorism is alleged to be, but sometimes a rationale is set forth, as in a 1998 document by Osama bin Laden and other leaders of militant Islamist groups, entitled "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders." Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Bernard Lewis says: "The statement—a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose—reveals a version of history that most Westerners will find unfamiliar. Bin Ladin's grievances are not quite what many would expect." The document says, in part:

Osama Bin Laden on Jihad

First—For more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples . . .

Second—Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance . . . the Americans nevertheless . . . are trying once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter . . . So they come again today to destroy what remains of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.

Third—While the purposes of the Americans in these wars are religious and economic, they also serve . . . to divert attention from [Jewish] occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims in it.[5]

In a similar vein, one of the suicide bombers in the 2005 London subway bombings provided his rationale for that action. As reported by ABC News:

The video also contained a long testimonial from one of the London bombers, Tanweer, in which he gave his motives for taking part in the attacks and warned of more to come. Some of it appeared in the edited version broadcast by al-Jazeera.

"For the non-Muslims in Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this," Tanweer said in a thick north English accent. Britons oppress "our mothers and children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya," he said.

"Your government has openly supported the genocide of more than 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah," he added, referring to the west Iraqi town where U.S. troops fought Islamic militants for several weeks.

"You have openly declared war on Islam … I tell every British citizen to stop your support to your lying British government and to the so-called war on terror. And ask yourselves: Why would thousands of men be ready to give their lives for the cause of Muslims?"

"What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks that will continue and increase in strength until you withdraw your soldiers from Afghanistan and Iraq," he warned.[6]

Whatever one thinks of the ends terrorists pursue, one cannot understand terrorism without considering what those ends are and the motives of those who pursue them in this way.

Terrorism seeks to achieve its ends by breaking the will of the thousands who learn of it. That's why publicity is important to its success. Whereas war intimidates by inflicting losses, terrorism—at least until, or unless, terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction—intimidates by instilling fear.

Conventional war, however, *may* also be terroristic. Its rationale then is usually military necessity. This was put bluntly by Germany's Kaiser during the First World War. He said:

Terroristic Warfare

My soul is torn, but everything must be put to fire and sword; men, women, and children and old men must be slaughtered and not a tree or house be left standing. With these methods of terrorism, which are alone capable of affecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I admit considerations of humanity it will be prolonged for years.[7]

Much the same rationale, though never stated as directly, underlay the US fire-bombings of Tokyo and Dresden and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki during the Second World War. They employed massive, indiscriminate violence against mostly innocent people. The aim, in each case, was to destroy the morale of the country.

Because of the resources at a government's command, *state terror* is often the most systematic kind. When governments terrorize openly, they have a propaganda apparatus to justify what they do. When they terrorize surreptitiously, they can recruit, train, and finance operatives beyond the reach of public view. And they can direct terror against their own people. Stalin did this in the 1930s, as did South Africa and many Latin American governments in the past. But whereas many governments operate through torture and death squads, some enlist the country's legal system in the service of terrorism. Stalin worked though the Soviet Union's legal institutions. There was no gunfire in the night, no bodies on Moscow's outskirts in the morning. Yet through trial, conviction, and execution, perceived enemies were eliminated as effectively as though they had been gunned down. In the process, countless others were terrified into submission.

15.4 Who are terrorists?

Terrorism is commonly represented as primarily Arab and Muslim. When a toy manufacturer produced a doll representing a terrorist, the doll was named Nomad, dressed in Arab garb and, according to the company's description, engaged in "terrorist assaults on innocent villages."[8] Political cartoonists often depict terrorists as grizzled and wearing keffiyehs. US President Trump's 2017 executive order designed to keep terrorists from entering the country was directed against six Muslim countries, and all of them except Iran were also Arab countries.

It's true that some of the most dramatic acts of terrorism, from the Munich Olympics in 1972 to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, were by Arabs. But it's wrong to represent even Middle East terrorism as exclusively Arab. The Jewish underground used terrorism against the British in Palestine. Both Yitzhak Shamir and Menachem Begin who later became Israeli prime ministers led such groups.[9] Iran, which is high on the US list of terrorist governments, isn't even an Arab country (it's Persian). Nor is Arab terrorism all the work of Muslims. The Phalangists who massacred Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps of Lebanon in 1982 were Christians. Also Christian were the founders of the two principal PLO factions after Fatah: George Habash[10] of the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine and Nawef Hawatmeh of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Nor is terrorism by any means confined to the Middle East. The Pol Pot regime undertook a campaign of genocidal terror in Cambodia exceeded in recent history only by the Nazis' extermination of Jews. Terror was used by the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the African National Congress in South Africa.[11] The 1995 Oklahoma City terror bombing—second in casualties only to 9/11 in American history—was by Timothy McVeigh, a white middle-class veteran who had earned a Bronze Star in the Gulf War.

15.5 How some terrorists view themselves

Is the terrorist as a person necessarily any worse than the soldier in uniform? Both are prepared to kill other human beings. If the one uses unconventional means, that's likely because they're all he has. It would be odd to say that if terrorists had an army, navy, and air force at their disposal, it would be all right to use them, but since they don't, they may not use homemade bombs (as the Boston marathon bombers did) or box-cutters (as the 9/11 hijackers did). Rank and file soldiers do what they do because they're told to. Often they've been drafted or recruited and have little understanding of the issues for which they're required to kill. No doubt the same is true of many terrorists, who are recruited by propaganda. But terrorists often do what they do knowledgeably and with belief in the rightness of their cause. Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a shy, serious son of a wealthy banker, reportedly thought that "God was guiding him to jihad" in his failed attempt in 2009 to blow up a US airliner on route to Detroit with explosives hidden in his underwear.[12] They also often think of themselves as engaged in a legitimate military struggle. When Palestinian Georges Abdalla was convicted of terrorist activities in France, he claimed that he was a "Palestinian fighter," not a terrorist.[13] Former Jewish terrorists gathered to reminisce about their 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem that left ninety-one dead. One reportedly said, "I am very proud of the operation militarily. I felt myself like a soldier of these Jewish forces."[14] As Algerian-born suspected terrorist Kamel Daoudi awaited trial in Paris, he said: "I accept the name of terrorist if it is used to mean that I terrorize a one-sided system of

iniquitous power and a perversity that comes in many forms. I have never terrorized innocent individuals and I will never do so. But I will fight any form of injustice and those who support it."[15] Aimal Khan Kasi, in a death row interview before his execution for killing two CIA employees, said, "What I did was in retaliation against the US government" for its Middle Eastern policy and support of Israel. "It had nothing to do with terrorism," he said, adding that he opposed the killing of American citizens in the September 11, 2001, attack.[16] To all appearances, these are people who commit themselves to a cause and pursue it with conviction. It's precisely because their conviction—at least as measured by their willingness to sacrifice and kill—is stronger than that of the average person that they're willing to do things most people consider abhorrent.

The point is that it's a mistake to represent terrorism as the work of one people or one religion or one government. Any people desperate enough are capable of engaging in it, any government unscrupulous enough is capable of using it.

15.6 Terrorism and the killing of innocents

Terrorism is intentionally directed against civilians more often than is standard warfare, and it's widely assumed that doing so is its primary objective. That assumption apparently underlay the 2011 killing of an American, Anwar al-Awlaki, a supporter of jihad, by a US drone strike in Yemen.

Key Quote 15B

Mr. Awlaki became the first American citizen deliberately killed on the order of a president, without criminal charges or trial, since the Civil War … Mr. Obama argued that killing Mr. Awlaki was the equivalent of a justified police shooting of a gunman who was threatening civilians.[17]

But, as the preceding quotation from the Kaiser (Section 15.3) attests, warfare can and does target civilians. The terror bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima,

and Nagasaki probably killed more civilians than have been killed by terrorists throughout the world in all the years since.[18] The majority of the fifty million or so killed in the Second World War were civilians, as most likely would be the majority of persons killed in any sizable war in the future. While most of them were not targeted as civilians, many of their deaths were foreseeable from the military actions that caused them.

During the Vietnam War, both sides terrorized the civilians whose support they needed. The Vietcong, for example, would steal into villages that collaborated with the South Vietnamese and US troops and disembowel the village leader in front the rest of the villagers. On the American side, a US officer who had commented upon the gloomy prospects of success in operations in the delta area was asked what the answer was:

> "Terror," he said pleasantly. "The Vietcong have terrorized the peasants to get their cooperation . . . We must terrorize the villagers even more, so they see that their real self-interest lies with us. We've got to start bombing and strafing the villages that aren't friendly to the Government." He then added, "Of course we won't do it. That's not our way of doing things . . . But terror is what it takes."[19]

It was reported soon after: "U.S. and allied forces are adopting a program of destroying homes and crops in areas which feed and shield the communist forces. For years, Americans have refused to participate in 'scorched earth' efforts, leaving them to the Vietnamese. Now Americans are directly involved."[20]

Washington Post correspondent John T. Wheeler reported on one such operation on March 30, 1967:

> The Vietnamese woman ignored the crying baby in her arms. She stared in hatred as the American infantrymen with shotguns blasted away at chickens and ducks. Others shot a water buffalo and the family dog. While her husband, father and young son were led away, the torch was put to the hut that still contained the family belongings. The flames consumed everything—including the shrine to the family ancestors. The GIs didn't have much stomach for the job, but orders were orders . . . "God, my wife would faint if she could see what I'm doing now," an infantryman said. "Killing . . . [Vietcong] is one thing, but killing puppies and baby ducks and stuff like that—it's something else, man."

More recently, US fighter pilots reportedly were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if necessary to prevent it from reaching Washington on 9/11. They were prepared to kill the innocent passengers to achieve their objective (to prevent the plane from reaching its target). The hijackers, for their part, were prepared to kill those same people in the course of trying to achieve *their* objective (perhaps to destroy the White House[21]). Would the killing of innocents have been permissible in the one case but not in the other?

It might be argued that the US pilots wouldn't have intended to kill the passengers, even though they knew that they would do so if they shot the plane down. But such reasoning is available to terrorists as well. The hijackers of Flight 93 might not have intended to kill those particular persons either. But it was foreseeable that they would do so, and they were willing to do so in pursuit of their objective (believed to be to strike a target in Washington). In fact, the hijackers of the four planes on 9/11 probably would have preferred to fly empty planes that day; it would have simplified their task. (Rebellious passengers, after all, are believed to have caused the premature crash of Flight 93.) It's hard to believe, though, that they didn't intend to kill the persons in the World Trade Center and Pentagon. But even there, with a little philosophical ingenuity they might have argued that their objective wasn't to kill civilians at all, though it was foreseeable that they would do so; it was, rather, to destroy symbols of US military and economic power. Had the nearly 3,000 persons who were killed on 9/11 been assembled in an open field and the hijackers been confronted with the choice of killing them or striking an empty World Trade Center, Pentagon, and White House, they might well have chosen to do the latter. If their aim had been simply to kill Americans, they could more easily have done that by attacking crowded football stadiums, and they could have done so (and spared their own lives) simply by planting explosives rather than by crashing airliners into buildings.

In the case of the hijackers, most people would be quick to say that such reasoning isn't good enough; that if the hijackers could foresee that they would kill innocents, they are culpable. But if we say that, then we must be prepared to point out a moral difference between that and the cases in which military power is used in ways that will foreseeably though not intentionally kill innocents. For example, on July 23, 2002, Israel dropped a 2,000-pound bomb in a Gaza neighborhood that killed not only the targeted Hamas leader but 15 others as well, including 9 children.[22] They weren't targeting the children. But it was foreseeable that they would kill them. Estimates of the number of Iraqi civilian casualties by the London-based Iraq Body Count range from 170,635 to 190,240. These, too, no

doubt weren't targeted as civilians. Yet such deaths are foreseeable in urban warfare. If we cannot point to a moral difference between the killing of innocents by terrorists and the killing of innocents by soldiers in warfare, then it might be argued that they should be judged similarly. This would represent an application of the principle of universalizability discussed in Theory Box 1F in Chapter 1, Section 1.10, slightly modified to deal with actions rather than treatment of persons:

Theory Box 15A

As formulated in Theory Box 1F, the **principle of universalizability (U)** asserts:

U: Persons ought to be treated similarly unless there are morally relevant dissimilarities among them.

We may take this to imply also:

U_1: Acts should be judged similarly unless there are morally relevant dissimilarities among them.

The point is that the deliberate killing of innocents doesn't in itself suffice to distinguish terrorism from much of conventionally accepted military violence. For that reason, it's unclear why the same logic thought to justify the killing of civilians in wartime—namely, that so doing is believed unavoidable, useful, or necessary in the pursuit of one's ends—doesn't equally justify killing them in terroristic violence. Or, to turn the matter around, it's unclear why the killing of civilians by soldiers in wartime isn't as bad as the killing of them by terrorists.

15.7 What is war?

In any event, while terrorism is almost universally condemned, war is almost universally accepted. By that is meant that nearly everyone thinks that war is sometimes morally justified. The so-called *just war tradition* attempts to provide a moral justification for war.

As with terrorism, there's no consensus as to precisely what war is. Over the centuries it has been given many definitions. One of the most famous is by the nineteenth-century German writer Karl von Clausewitz (1792–1831).

1. "War is … an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[23]

This is overly broad, of course. Unless one thinks of an "act" as possibly extending over 5, 10, or 20 years—as wars sometimes do—war cannot plausibly be identified with a single act. Sticking a gun in someone's ribs and saying "Your money or your life" is an act of violence intended to compel another person (whether an opponent or not) to fulfill one's will, but it surely doesn't represent war.

Another definition is offered by political scientist Quincy Wright (1890–1970):

2. War is "the *legal condition* which *equally* permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a *conflict* by *armed* force."[24]

Unlike definition (1), this definition introduces the notion of law; war is understood as a legal condition. It also represents the condition as one that permits groups to use armed force. The notion of "groups" is, however, vague and sets no limits to what may count as groups for purposes of understanding war (states, societies, militias?). And obviously, "hostile groups" can go to war illegally if their conflict is in violation of international law.

Still another definition, offered by Francis Lieber (1798–1872), the nineteenth-century writer on the laws of war, identifies the groups in question:

3. War is "a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments."[25]

Unlike definitions (1) and (2), definition (3) identifies sovereign states as the actors in war. Whether or not armed hostility rises to the level of warfare, however, might be questioned. There often are border skirmishes between states (as, e.g., between India and Pakistan over Kashmir) that arguably represent armed hostilities but which do not amount to war.

There are important elements in these conceptions of war, however—particularly those of violence and states. So let us propose the following as a definition of war in what we may call a standard sense:

Definition Box 15C

War: The pursuit of ends by two or more states through the use of organized, systematic violence against one another.

The term "war" is, of course, used in many ways—such as "civil war" and "guerilla war"—that depart from this standard sense. The further removed one gets from the standard sense, the more attenuated the sense of war that is utilized, to the point where when we speak of "war on poverty" or "war on drugs" we are using "war" in a metaphorical sense, not a literal sense. An interesting question is whether the so-called war on terrorism represents a literal sense of war or is merely metaphorical. It would appear to stand somewhere between the literal and metaphorical senses.

15.8 Can war be morally justified?

No one thinks that war is *always* justified. People usually believe that wars are bad because of the death and destruction they cause but can nonetheless sometimes be justified. Those who believe that some wars are justified we shall call *warists*. Following philosopher Duane Cady, in his book *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum*, we shall define "warism" as follows:

Definition Box 15D

Warism: The view that war is sometimes morally justified in practice as well as in theory.

On the other hand, those who say that war cannot be morally justified usually hold that war in the world we live in and as we know it is wrong, not that every conceivable war in hypothetical situations is wrong. That is, they believe that even if some wars could be justified in theory, war in practice is wrong. Those who hold this view are *conditional pacifists* as opposed to *absolute pacifists*—or pacifists for short. We'll define pacifism in Definition Box 15E.

In these terms, most people are warists. They support the armament of their country and the willingness of their governments to go to war if deemed necessary.

Why is there a moral problem with war? The obvious answer is because it causes death and destruction. More specifically, the problem for modern war can be posed in the following way:

1. Modern war makes large-scale, systematic use of lethal weapons for the purpose of killing human beings.

2. Whatever is done for that purpose is done with the intention to kill human beings.
3. The large-scale, systematic use of such weapons with that intention inevitably kills innocent human beings as well.
4. That it does so can be known.
5. What can be known (of the future) is foreseeable.
6. Therefore: Modern war intentionally kills human beings and foreseeably kills innocent human beings.

Intentionally killing tens of thousands or even millions of human beings is presumptively wrong. Even more so is foreseeably killing tens of thousands or even millions of innocent persons. If an act is presumptively wrong, the burden is on those who would perform it to show that the presumption can be defeated in the circumstances in which they propose to perform it. So there is a moral problem with war. Can war be justified?

15.9 The just war theory

War might be morally assessed from any of the basic positions in ethical theory regarding moral justification. Two main types of ethical theory are utilitarianism (already considered briefly in Chapter 1, Theory Box 1E, Section 1.8) and deontologism:

Theory Box 15B

Utilitarianism: An act is right if and only if it produces at least as great a balance of good over bad in its consequences as any other act available to the agent.

Deontologism: Value and consequences are either irrelevant or relevant but not decisive to the determination of right and wrong.

For example, war might be morally assessed purely in terms of its consequences, and more specifically, in terms of the value of its consequences. (See Chapter 6, Theory Box 6B, Section 6.5.) Such a consequentialist (or more specifically, utilitarian) justification would require that one consider nothing other than the consequences of war and the balance of good and evil in those consequences. In its simplest form, a consequentialist justification

would say that if a particular war produced at least as great a balance of good over evil in its consequences as any other alternative, then it was justified; otherwise it wasn't. If it brought about a greater balance of good over evil, then it was not only justified, it was morally obligatory.

Deontological ethical theories, on the other hand, would say that either the consequences of a war are irrelevant to its justification; or if they are relevant, they aren't decisive in assessing whether the war was justified. A deontologist might say, for example, that if a war violates trust as embodied in international treaties, or if it kills innocent people, then it may fail to be justified even if it brings about a greater good. Some things, the deontologist says, are equally, or even more, important than the value of consequences.

The just war theory (JWT) has roots in Cicero (106–43 BCE), the Roman lawyer and philosopher, and St. Augustine (354–430), an early church bishop who is often thought of as the father of the JWT. Over the centuries there evolved both religious and secular versions, and today it's widely considered the main ethical approach to the justification of war. The JWT has a deontological moral foundation. It attaches weight to consequences but holds that other types of considerations are relevant as well. The JWT has received many formulations. but it typically consists of two parts, referred to by Latin terms.

Theory Box 15C

Jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war) sets forth the conditions that must be met in order for a state to be justified in resorting to war in the first place.

Jus in bello (justice in the conduct of war) sets forth the conditions that must be met in the conduct of war once it's begun, whether or not one was justified in going to war in the first place.

A standard representation of these conditions is the following:

Theory Box 15D

Just War Theory

Jus ad bellum (JAB)	Jus in bello (JIB)
Just cause	**Proportionality**

Competent authority	**Discrimination**
Right intention	
Probability of success	
Comparative justice	
Proportionality	
Last resort	

According to JWT, all of the conditions in the first column must be met in order to be justified in going to war in the first place. The two conditions in the second column must be met in order for the war to be conducted justly once begun. For a war as conducted by a state to be fully just, the conditions of both *jus ad bellum* (JAB) and *jus in bello* (JIB) must be met. One might be justified in going to war (assuming that some wars are justified) but conduct the war abominably—for example, by committing atrocities and wantonly killing civilians. By the same token, one might have wrongfully gone to war in the first place (hence have violated the conditions of JAB) but conduct the war scrupulously according to the provisions of JIB. Although JWT tends to say that a war cannot be just if it fails to meet the conditions of JAB, it has no clear answer to the question whether a war is just that meets the conditions of JAB but fails (sometimes, often, or much of the time) to meet the conditions of JIB.

As indicated, the JWT has both religious and secular forms. They emphasize more or less the same conditions, though sometimes with different interpretations of those conditions. The JWT plays a prominent role in the Catholic Church, and in a 1983 Pastoral Letter the American Catholic bishops explained the conditions of a just war. These constitute a representative example of modern thinking about JWT:

Jus Ad Bellum

Just Cause: War is permissible only to confront "a real and certain danger," i.e., to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to secure basic human rights . . .

Competent Authority: In the Catholic tradition the right to use force has always been joined to the common good; war must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals . . .

Comparative Justice: Every party to a conflict should acknowledge the limits of its "just cause" and the consequent requirement to use

only limited means in pursuit of its objectives. Far from legitimizing a crusade mentality, comparative justice is designed to relativize absolute claims and to restrain the use of force in a "justified" conflict . . .

Right Intention: Right intention is related to just cause—war can be legitimately intended only for the reasons set forth above as a just cause. During the conflict, right intention means pursuit of peace and reconciliation, including avoiding unnecessarily destructive acts or imposing unreasonable conditions (e.g., unconditional surrender).

Last Resort: For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted . . .

Probability of Success: This is a difficult criterion to apply, but its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile. The determination includes a recognition that at times defense of key values, even against great odds, may be a "proportionate" witness.

Proportionality: In terms of the *jus ad bellum* criteria, proportionality means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms . . . This principle of proportionality applies throughout the conduct of the war as well as to the decision to begin warfare.

Jus in Bello: Even when the stringent conditions which justify resort to war are met, the conduct of war (i.e., strategy, tactics, and individual actions) remains subject to continuous scrutiny in light of two principles . . . These principle are proportionality and discrimination . . . Just response to aggression must be discriminate; it must be directed against unjust aggressors, not against innocent people caught up in a war not of their making . . . The principle prohibits directly intended attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets . . .

When confronting choices among specific military options, the question asked by proportionality is: once we take into account not only the military advantages that will be achieved by using this means but also all the harms reasonably expected to follow from using it, can its use still be justified?[26]

These conditions each admit of substantial elaboration. We cannot go into all of them here, but particularly noteworthy is the understanding of **just cause**, which according to the bishops' account consists of any or all of the following:

1. Avenging the violation of a right
2. Self-defense
3. Protecting the innocent

Self-defense normally implies that one has been aggressed against. Hence the notion of aggression figures prominently in discussions of war and international relations. But both (1) and (2) leave open the possibility that the side with a just cause may initiate a war (in that sense, aggressing against another state). In the case of avenging the violation of a right, one might hold that a state needn't wait until it's aggressed against to initiate a war against another state; it may initiate a war itself if it has a just cause. In the case of (3), for example, if a state is committing atrocities against its own citizens, another state may (assuming that other conditions are met) wage war against the first state on behalf of the rights of the oppressed (the rationale for so-called humanitarian military intervention). Even the notion of self-defense in (2) is sometimes expanded to mean "pre-emptive" or even "preventive" self-defense, in which case one may claim to be acting in self-defense if one initiates the actual fighting, either to anticipate an imminent attack by an adversary or to forestall an attack that may not be imminent. The result in the first case is *preemptive war*, in the second case it is *preventive war*. This option was made explicit by President George W. Bush:

Key Quote 15C

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense [Contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter].[27]

15.10 War and the killing of innocents

Even the most ardent warists are troubled by the killing of innocent persons in wartime. The JWT, in the principle of discrimination under JIB, addresses this issue. That principle requires that in the conduct of war (whether the war was justly entered into or not) one must discriminate between those one may permissibly kill (combatants on the other side) and those one may not permissibly kill (civilians or innocent persons).

When warfare was hand-to-hand, one could easily abide by this principle. If you were fighting with clubs, swords, spears, and even bows and arrows you could clearly choose whether or not to kill persons who weren't directly engaged in combat with you. In modern warfare it's more difficult and sometimes impossible. With bombs, artillery, drones, and missiles it's impossible to be certain that you won't sometimes kill noncombatants or innocent persons.

Just warists (as we may call advocates of the JWT) tend to appeal to a principle we encountered in connection with terrorism. The principle distinguishes between the *intentional* killing of innocents/noncombatants, either as a means or as an end, and the foreseeable killing of innocents/noncombatants incidental to the pursuit of other, legitimate ends. The central element of this principle—*right intention*—is one of the conditions of JAB. There, the requirement is that if one is to go to war justly, one must intend only to bring about a good. Even though it's foreseeable that if you wage war you will cause death, destruction, pain, and suffering, these cannot be what you aim at; bringing them about cannot be your intention. You have a *right* intention only if you intend to promote a good (such as any of the ends encompassed by a just cause).

The notion of right intention also figures prominently in the understanding of discrimination in JIB. For in the conduct of war, you may not intend to kill innocents/noncombatants either as an end (killing them for the sake of killing them) or as a means (to achieving some good). But you may kill them if their deaths are incidental and even foreseeable in the pursuit of legitimate ends. In the former case (killing them as an end or as a means) their killing is said to be *direct*, and that's prohibited. In the latter case, their killing is said to be *indirect*, and that's permissible (provided certain other conditions are met, such as that a greater good is expected to be achieved by the action that results in their deaths). An incident early in the Iraq War is illustrative:

Either Take a Shot or Take a Chance

At the base camp of the Fifth marine Regiment here, two sharpshooters … sat on a sand berm and swapped combat tales while their column stood at a halt on the road toward Baghdad … They said Iraqi fighters had often mixed in with civilians from nearby villages, jumping out of houses and cars to shoot at them, and then often running away. The marines said they had little trouble dispatching their foes, most of whom they characterized as ill trained and cowardly.

"We had a great day," [one marine said]. "We killed a lot of people."

> Both marines said they were most frustrated by the practice of some Iraqi soldiers to use unarmed women and children as shields against American bullets. They called the tactic cowardly but agreed that it had been effective … [T]hey said they had declined several times to shoot at Iraqi soldiers out of fear they might hit civilians.
>
> "It's a judgment call," [one marine said]. "If the risks outweigh the losses, then you don't take the shot."
>
> But in the heat of a firefight, both men conceded, when the calculus often warps, a shot not taken in one set of circumstances may suddenly present itself as a life-or-death necessity.
>
> "We dropped a few civilians," [one said], "but what do you do?"
>
> To illustrate, the sergeant offered a pair of examples from earlier in the week.
>
> "There was one Iraqi soldier, and 25 women and children," he said. "I didn't take the shot."
>
> But more than once … he faced a different choice: one Iraqi soldier standing among two or three civilians. He recalled one such incident, in which he and other men in his unit opened fire. He recalled watching one of the women standing near the Iraqi soldier go down.
>
> "I'm sorry," the sergeant said. "But the chick was in the way."[28]

There is a second and even more complex problem with the killing of innocents/noncombatants in war. We've been speaking as though the categories of innocents and noncombatants were the same. They aren't. Noncombatant is a morally neutral category. It simply designates someone who's not a certifiable participant in combat—someone who's not in the military, not wearing a uniform, and not engaged in fighting. Innocence implies that one is free of guilt or wrongdoing. That implies a moral judgment. It signifies that one is free of guilt or wrongdoing with regard to the particular war in question. Many noncombatants (e.g., members of government) may not be innocent in this sense; and many combatants may be innocent. It's more difficult to be confident that one isn't killing innocent persons in warfare than it is to be confident that one isn't killing noncombatants.

We can illustrate these points by means of a mythical example. Suppose King Mighty the Great launches an unjust aggressive war against King Great the Mighty. All of those fighting for King Great will be fighting a just war (assuming that the other conditions of JAB and JIB are met). They'll be free of any wrongdoing relative to that particular war. Although they're

combatants, they'll be innocent. The killing of them by King Mighty's soldiers will be the killing of innocent persons. In principle—and almost certainly always in fact—the killing of innocent persons will be unavoidable in any war in which one side is acting justly and the other is acting unjustly. Not only that, but many—and perhaps most—of the soldiers who are fighting for King Mighty may be innocent as well. They'll include farmers, cobblers, and blacksmiths who have been pressed into service by the king. They may have little or no knowledge of why King Mighty attacked King Great and have no responsibility for any wrongdoing. They may be innocent as well, by which the killing of them by King Great's soldiers will also be the killing of innocent persons.[29]

The upshot is that while in principle it's possible to avoid killing noncombatants in warfare (if, e.g., all combat were hand-to-hand), it's virtually impossible to avoid killing innocent persons. It's not the point of war to kill innocent persons, but modern war inevitably does so.

15.11 War and the killing of soldiers

It is in the nature of war, however, to kill soldiers. While one could hypothesize wars fought with water pistols or paintballs, one cannot have a war in any standard sense without the killing of soldiers. That's what the conduct of war is about. If the killing of soldiers by one another in warfare is impermissible, then war is impermissible.

It's often assumed without question that it's permissible for soldiers on all sides to kill one another, whether they're fighting in a just war or not. Once one has entered the military, it's thought that one becomes licensed, so to speak, to kill other human beings without limit in warfare. It's just that those one kills must be combatants, which means that they're similarly licensed to kill you. In these circumstances, according to this thinking, in the process of becoming licensed to kill you also forfeit a right to life at the hands of others who, like you, have been given identical licensure by their government. The essentials of this outlook are expressed by political scientist Michael Walzer.

> In our judgments of the fighting, we abstract from all consideration of the justice of the cause. We do this because the moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the same: they are led to

fight by their loyalty to their own states and by their lawful obedience. They are most likely to believe that their wars are just, and while the basis of that belief is not necessarily rational inquiry but, more often, a kind of unquestioning acceptance of official propaganda, nevertheless they are not criminals; they face one another as moral equals . . .

Now, aggression is . . . a criminal activity, but our view of its participants is very different; . . . In the course of an aggressive war, a soldier shoots another soldier, a member of the enemy army defending his homeland. Assuming a conventional firefight, this is not called murder; nor is the soldier regarded after the war as a murderer, even by his former enemies. The case is in fact no different from what it would be if the second soldier shot the first. Neither man is a criminal, and so both can be said to act in self-defense . . . [S]o long as they fight in accordance with the rules of war, no condemnation is possible.[30]

This condition, in which soldiers may permissibly kill one another in wartime, has sometimes been called the moral equality of soldiers. I shall refer to it as the *moral expendability of soldiers* (MES). The permissibility of war depends upon MES.

15.12 Are soldiers morally expendable?

One line of reasoning to try to establish MES contends that the guilt or innocence of soldiers is irrelevant to judgments we make of the conduct of war. Soldiers, in this view, are dangerous people. Through their training they've allowed themselves to become dangerous people. Hence when they meet on the battlefield, they're all fighting in self-defense, which they have a right to do. As Walzer puts it in another passage:

Key Quote 15D

Simply by fighting, whatever their private hopes and intentions, they [soldiers] have lost their title to life and liberty, and they have lost it even though, unlike aggressor states, they have committed no crime.[31]

Hence soldiers may permissibly kill one another, regardless of the justice of the cause for which they do so.

We might formulate this reasoning a little more precisely:

1. If soldiers forfeit their right to life, then the killing of soldiers by one another is morally permissible.
   a. Persons forfeit their right to life when they allow themselves to become dangerous persons.
   b. Persons allow themselves to become dangerous persons when they enter the military.
   c. The soldiers (by definition) have entered the military.
   d. Therefore: The soldiers are dangerous persons.
2. Therefore: Soldiers forfeit their right to life.
3. Therefore: The killing of soldiers by one another is morally permissible (MES).

The claim in 1(d) doesn't mean, of course, that every soldier at every moment is dangerous. All soldiers sleep and many repair equipment, cook meals, or do paperwork as their main duties. The point is, rather, that in wartime they're all part of a war effort, hence are dangerous to the soldiers on the other side. In the military everyone trains to kill. But not everyone's main duty is to kill. Those who don't kill (which is often true of most soldiers in a war) support those who do in various ways. It's in that sense that they may be considered dangerous.

Does it follow, however, that soldiers forfeit their right to life, as (2) asserts? One line of reasoning to try to support that conclusion is that when soldiers, as dangerous people, meet on the battlefield, they're all fighting in self-defense. Since everyone (according to this reasoning) has a right to self-defense, soldiers have a right to kill one another.

15.13 Is there an absolute right to kill in self-defense?

Many people believe that war is justified in self-defense. They believe that individuals are justified in killing in self-defense, hence that states are justified in killing in national defense. Thus at least defensive wars are morally justified.

The argument we considered in the previous section doesn't purport to show that states are justified in waging war (and killing) in self-defense,

though it's consistent with that view. It purports to show that since soldiers on both sides in a war are justified in killing in self-defense, soldiers are morally expendable. They may kill one another with moral impunity, because they're all acting in self-defense.

But is the right to kill in self-defense an absolute right? Are you justified in killing other persons in any circumstances in which you believe yourself threatened by them?

The problem of self-defense arises only when one is in a dangerous situation and there is some imminent threat to life or limb. Whether one is justified in killing in such situations may depend upon whether one has *knowingly* and *voluntarily* entered into the situation. And it may depend upon whether one bears some responsibility for the situation's being dangerous in the first place.

If you deliberately enter the den of a hungry lion, are you then justified in killing the lion if it attacks you? You had the option not to enter the den in the first place. Let's suppose that you have the option to retreat and close a gate behind you if the lion approaches. You could have chosen not to enter the den; and you could choose to leave the den unharmed (at least until the lions' jaws clamp down on you). Only if you choose to stay is your life in jeopardy. Do you have the right to kill the lion with the gun you carry?

Take another case. Suppose you favor stern action to wipe out drug addiction and crime, as do some governments. You'd like nothing better than to kill some of those responsible for the drug problem. So you venture out in the middle of the night and walk alone in a high-crime area where there's a likelihood of being mugged. Sure enough, someone tries to mug you, and you draw your gun and kill him. You were under assault. You were acting in self-defense. Were you justified in so doing? You chose to enter the dangerous situation. You did so in the hope of being assaulted. Your intention was to kill someone in the course of defending yourself.

Cases of this sort raise serious questions about whether there's an absolute right of self-defense. At the least, avoiding dangerous situations—or removing oneself from them when that is possible—are moral options that must be weighed into the scales.

Soldiers know that if they enter the military they're agreeing to being sent into dangerous situations on the orders of others. They also know that if they were to remove themselves from dangerous situations once they are in them, which might not be possible, there would no longer be an issue of self-defense. (There might be severe penalties, though, at the hands of their superiors if they were to do this.) They also know, if they've reflected on the

argument for MES, that their adversaries have a moral right to kill them only if they—the adversaries—are in imminent danger from them. Adversaries are entitled to kill you, on the view we're considering, only on grounds of self-defense. If you cease to be a threat to them, they no longer have a moral right to kill you (unless they have some other reason than self-defense). You've defused the dangerous situation. If soldiers on both sides cease their threat to one another, none of them has a license to kill. And none of them has forfeited his right to life.

15.14 The paradox of the moral expendability of soldiers

Things aren't this simple in practice. In the stress and confusion of war (or the threat of war) it'll often be difficult to know precisely whether others pose a threat to you and you to them. In practice, it would no doubt be virtually impossible for soldiers to cease being the threats they are to one another when fighting is under way. They might be court-martialed or shot on the spot by their commanding officers. However, the principle is clear: by the above argument, soldiers can render it morally impermissible for other soldiers to kill them by ceasing to be a threat to those other soldiers. Soldiers on all sides can render it morally wrong to kill them by renouncing their license to kill. If they can in principle do that, then it's an open question whether the right to self-defense is justifiably exercised in these circumstances. If the MES doesn't obtain, then it's difficult to see how war can be morally justified, whatever one says of the rights of collectivities to self-defense.

Even if this were not correct, there is something paradoxical about MES. If it's morally permissible for soldiers on all sides to kill one another, then (assuming that they are abiding by the laws of war and the constraints of *jus in bello*), nothing they do is wrong. Virtually everything that happens once a war begins is morally permissible, irrespective of the justice or injustice of the reasons for the war. It's difficult, in that case, to make any sense of saying that any such a war is unjust. For this reason, one of the main tenets of JWT—the MES—seems to conflict with the whole point of the JWT, which is to enable one to distinguish just from unjust wars. It's paradoxical to say that a country acts unjustly in going to war but that everything it does once the fighting commences is morally permissible.

15.15 Pacifism

Pacifism is opposition to war. As such, it's distinguished from nonviolence, since you might oppose war but think violence in some situations is permissible. Nonetheless, early pacifism usually derived from an explicit or implicit commitment to *nonviolence*. This is true of early Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Taoism, and the Hinduism espoused by Gandhi in his interpretation of the *Bhagavad Gita*. An exception is Moism in ancient China, which is expressly pacifistic but doesn't espouse nonviolence.

Pacifism may be personal, principled, or pragmatic, depending upon how it's grounded. We may distinguish the following forms of pacifism:

Definition Box 15E

Personal Pacifism: Opposition to war as a personal commitment not considered binding on others.
Principled Pacifism: Opposition to war on grounds considered valid for all. For example:

a. **Religious Pacifism: Pacifism based on religious or spiritual grounds.**
b. **Moral Pacifism: Pacifism based on moral grounds.**
c. **Pragmatic Pacifism: Pacifism based on purely rational and practical grounds, such as the belief that war is an irrational, costly, and ineffective way to pursue one's ends.**

Personal pacifists might agree with pragmatic pacifists that war is impractical. And like principled pacifists, they might take their renunciation of war to have a moral or religious character. They just don't insist that others make that same commitment they do. Personal commitment, rather than general principles about religion, morality, or practicality are central to their pacifism.

Principled pacifists, for their part, can also agree that war is ineffective. That is, they can secondarily be pragmatic pacifists as well. But that isn't their main reason for being pacifists. Their main reason is their belief that war is wrong for everyone (moral pacifism) and/or contrary to certain religious or spiritual commitments everyone should espouse (religious pacifism).

Pragmatic pacifists can agree that war is morally wrong or contrary to various religious or spiritual outlooks. That is, they can secondarily be principled pacifists. But their main reason for being pacifists is their conviction that war is impractical. Whereas principled pacifists are likely to think of war as wrong, pragmatic pacifists are likely to think of it first of all as wasteful or irrational.

15.16 Conclusion: a common ground between warists and pacifists

There's a little-noticed aspect of war: that it's a cooperative activity on the part of those engaged in it. (This is implied in the definition of war by Quincy Wright in Section 15.7, though the emphasis there is on a legal condition.) It's as though both sides tacitly agree to try to settle their differences by means of large-scale, systematic military violence. In times past, there were often formal declarations of war, in which these intentions were made explicit. Today that rarely happens. But the cooperative nature of war remains. If either side refuses to try to resolve the differences between it and the other side by fighting, war cannot take place. The other side could still attack the side that refuses to wage war. That would be aggression, but it wouldn't be war. War wouldn't begin until the side aggressed against chose to fight back. War requires that both sides agree, expressly or implicitly, to fight.

This is one of the points of difference between war and terrorism. Terrorism requires only the unilateral decision by one side (individual, group, state) to use violence. It doesn't require a cooperative response by the other side.

A simple example illustrates the point. High-speed chases involving police and suspects are common. They frequently result in death or injury. But they occur only because the police and the suspects tacitly agree to them. It's not as though the police say, "Okay, we'll give you a head start and then try to catch you." Rather, when they see a traffic violation or suspect a crime, they attempt to pull the person over. The driver of the car then makes the decision to try to evade arrest and speeds off. The police then turn on their sirens and give chase. If either the police didn't give chase or the suspect pulled over at the sign of the flashing lights there would be no high-speed chase. The chase depends upon the willingness of both to try to achieve their ends

(the police to apprehend the suspect, the suspect to evade apprehension) by outracing each other.

So with war. Wars can take place only if two (or more) sides tacitly agree to try to resolve their differences by fighting. War *cannot* take place otherwise. Moreover, just as neither the police nor the suspects can engage in a high-speed chase unless their cars have gasoline and the engines are working, so states cannot wage war unless they have armies and weapons and unless some persons in those armies are willing to command others to kill and those others are prepared to obey those commands. That is the structure of every army in the world.

This suggests, therefore, an argument that can provide a starting point for discussing the justifiability of war:

1. War is a cooperative undertaking between warring parties. If either side refuses to fight, war cannot take place.
2. For both sides to cooperate in fighting:
   a. Some persons on each side must command others to kill;
   b. Some persons on each side must obey commands to kill.
3. Therefore: If enough people on either side refuse to kill on command or to command others to kill, war cannot take place.

Both warists and pacifists should be able to agree on all of these points. Where they will disagree will be on such issues as what the consequences would be if one side refuses to fight when the other is bent on aggression, or whether persons have a moral right to command others to kill (and to enforce those commands) or a moral right to kill on the command of others. These are all legitimate questions and can provide a focus for the discussion of the morality of war. But it should be understood that the common view that there's no way to end war is mistaken. War ends if human beings cease to fight wars.

Study questions

1. What are the definitions of terrorism in Definition Boxes 15A and 15B? Why is the first called a *persuasive definition* and the second a *descriptive definition*? What difference does it make which definition one uses?
2. What are some of the *rationalizations for terrorism* considered in Section 15.3?

3. What is *war* (Definition Box 15C)?
4. What is *warism* (Definition Box 15D)?
5. What is the *Just War Theory* (Section 15.9)? What are the components of the theory *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* (Theory Box 15C)?
6. What is the *moral expendability of soldiers* (Section 15.12)?
7. What is *Walzer's position* on the moral expendability of soldiers (Key Quote 15D)?
8. Is there an absolute right to kill in self-defense (Section 15.13)?
9. What is the *paradox of the moral expendability of soldiers* (Section 15.14)?
10. What is *pacifism* (Definition Box 15E)? How does considering war a cooperative undertaking between warring parties provide a possible common ground between *warists* and *pacifists* (Section 15.16)?

Notes

1 Albert Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 103.

2 Not that terrorism has a good track record at achieving its ends. As Walter Laqueur writes, "The decision to use terrorist violence is not always a rational one; if it were, there would be much less terrorism, since terrorist activity seldom achieves its aims." "Post Modern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5, September/October 1996, 31.

3 Leon Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 58.

4 http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-op-ed-bio-terrorism-epidemic-world-threat-2017-2.

5 Quoted from Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama [*sic*] bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998, 14–19.

6 Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. Copyright 2006 ABC News Internet Ventures.

7 Quoted in Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolka, and Robert Jay Lifton (eds), *Crimes of War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 135.

8 *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 10, 1986.

9 Begin's group, Irgun, was responsible for the 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Shamir was one of the leaders of the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) responsible for the assassination in 1944 of Lord Moyne, Britain's minister of state for the Middle East, and