Nested identities: national and European identity in Spain

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Abstract

This article focuses on Spain to explain individual variation in the strength of identification with Europe. It relies mainly on statistical analysis of a nationally representative survey conducted in March 2000, but also on historical and newspaper sources. The statistical results support Inglehart's hypotheses about the contribution of high degrees of cognitive mobilization and education to the development of a European identity, but contradict his Postmaterialism thesis. Also, they support Turner's and Tajfel's hypotheses about the role of positive group images in fostering identification with groups. Finally, they show that in Spain regional and national identities are compatible with a European identity. This result is consistent with Calhoun's and Brewer's view of nested group identities who do not see a priori incompatibility between nested identities. Furthermore, it supports the authors' claim that nested identities are potentially compatible, as in Spain, when they are not portrayed and seen as impinging on each other.

The degrees of legitimacy, peacefulness, and efficiency of modern states have been largely dependent on the extent to which they have succeeded in creating a sense of national identity among their citizens. Socialization agencies, such as the school and the army in the nineteenth century (Weber 1983), and the media in the twentieth century, have been instrumentalized by rulers to instil in the population a strong sense of national belonging. It is thus not surprising that the European Union [EU] has deployed considerable resources to measure and instil a sense of Europeanness in the populations of the member states. One example of this effort is the development of the concept of a European citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty,[1] whose most visible manifestations to ordinary citizens are the homogenization of national passports across the EU and the elimination of most border controls between EU member states.

The attempts by the EU to increase the degree of identification with

Europe among the population have generated controversy among academics. Indeed, some scholars have argued that efforts to re-create in Europe the type of identification that characterized the nation-state are ideologically questionable, based on a narrow and old-fashioned political project for Europe that is contrary to the principles underlying European integration (Weiler 1997), and may be unnecessary for the unity and cohesion of a certain type of postnational European polity (Shaw 1999; Koslowski 1999). Other scholars and influential newspapers stress the idea that regional and national identities set obstacles to the development of a European identity and of support for some kind of 'Federal' Europe. Hoffmann (1966, pp. 909–10), for example, has argued that the emergence of a federal Europe does not necessarily hinge on the pre-existence of a strong sense of belonging to Europe, but that such a federal Europe will not be stable unless a high degree of identification with Europe develops soon afterwards. Publications such as *The Economist* go further and posit that the development of a strong 'unifying national ethic' should precede steps towards federalism (6.29.91).[2] Anthony Smith (1992), while stressing that there is no a priori incompatibility between national identities and a European identity expresses some doubts about the possibility that a collective European identity could develop that would generate a strong degree of identification among its citizens. Regardless of what dimension of identity he focuses on – linguistic, territorial, religious, anti-foreigner, historical, cultural – he finds them all wanting.[3] Moreover, he does not see either schools or the media as contributing towards a we-feeling among the disparate nations that form Europe. Finally, Kourvetaris (1987) and Habermas (1996) claim that Europeans resist the idea of political unification because they do not want to sacrifice their ethnic identity.

When one refers to the development of a European identity one may be referring to at least two different things: the development of a sense of belonging to Europe or the development of a collective sense of what it means to be European. In this article we focus on the former, although we point out that the degree of identification with Europe by individuals depends on the meaning that Europe has for them. Despite scholarly interest in the role that identification with Europe should or may play in the process of European integration, there has been little theoretical and empirical work exploring the individual-level factors that explain variation in the degree of identification with Europe. There has also been little theory and research on the relationships between the degree of identification with a nation and the degree of identification with Europe and between the degree of identification with a region and the degree of identification with Europe. The purpose of this article is to use Spain as a case study to test dominant theories of group identity and to examine to what extent identification with a region and with the nation set obstacles to the development of a feeling of identification with

Europe. We review the literatures on European identity and on nested identities and develop theoretical predictions about the determinants of the degree of identification with various nested groups and about the relationship between lower-level and higher-level identifications; then, we examine how European integration has been framed in Spain over a fifty-year period and draw hypotheses about the expected relationships between regional and Spanish identifications and identification with Europe; finally, we use survey-data for Spain to estimate a statistical model that tests the different hypotheses discussed through the article.

Spain is a latecomer to the European Union, having become a member only in 1986. Surveys have shown, however, that its population widely supports efforts towards European integration and that a relatively high proportion of Spaniards identify themselves as Europeans (e.g. Duchesne and Frognier 1995). The strength of regional identities – e.g. The Catalan and the Basque – makes Spain an especially interesting case for examining the roles of identification with the nation and the region in furthering or slowing down the emergence of identification with Europe.

Background

The study of factors underlying the degree of identification with Europe must be differentiated from the study of support for European integration. They are different, though related, issues. It is logically and empirically possible to identify strongly with Europe but not see a need for the development of a political superstructure; vice versa, one may strongly support European political integration without strongly identifying with Europe. Most theoretical models and empirical studies have focused, however, on the issue of support for European integration and neglected the study of variation in identification with Europe, except at the descriptive level.[4] A survey of the empirical literature on European integration reveals in fact that the only theoretical model for understanding individual variability in the strength of European identity has been provided by Inglehart (1977), who in turn draws partly from Deutsch (1957, 1961) and Modernization Theory.

Inglehart explains individual variability in the strength of identification with Europe through three theoretical constructs: Cognitive mobilization, Education and Postmaterialism. High levels of cognitive mobilization and education contribute to the development of a European identity by embedding individuals in more cosmopolitan networks of communication; individuals can thus be classified in a parochialism-cosmopolitanism continuum, depending on their level of cognitive mobilization and education, and their position on this continuum determines their level of identification with Europe. Meanwhile, postmaterialist values further the development of a European identity

by making individuals receptive to identities such as the European, which according to the founders of the European Communities symbolizes the pursuit of peace and harmonious relations between different cultures. Inglehart's 1977 quantitative analysis seems to support both hypotheses but is based on questionable indicators for cognitive mobilization,[5] does not report key results and does not explore important implications.[6]

Concern about the reliability of Inglehart's results moved Janssen in 1991 to replicate parts of Inglehart's 1977 analysis with new data, slightly different indicators, and more sophisticated quantitative methods. His conclusion is that the relationship between cognitive mobilization and European identity is more robust than that between postmaterialist values and European identity. Janssen concludes that most of the effects of postmaterialism can be accounted for by the fact that postmaterialist individuals have greater levels of cognitive mobilization. Since Janssen's, few major articles have been published to test theories about the factors affecting individual variation in identification with Europe.

One exception is a recent article by Duchesne and Frognier (1995), devoted to analysing trends in identification with Europe, exploring the relationships between regional and national identities and European identity across countries, and examining the determinants of European identity. This analysis reveals great stability at a relatively low level of European identity between 1983 and 1991 and great international variation, with countries like Spain ranking relatively high and countries like Great Britain and Ireland ranking relatively low. The authors also explore correlations between different variables and European identity, which support Inglehart's hypotheses by showing that Education, Cognitive mobilization and Postmaterialism have the predicted positive effects.

Complementing the above work on the factors that explain the degree of identification with Europe, scholars have formulated hypotheses about and analysed the relationships between national identification and identification with Europe and between regional identification and identification with Europe. In his 1977 article Inglehart predicts a positive relationship between national and European identity and a negative relationship between regional identity and European identity. The logic of his argument is that national and European identities presuppose a cosmopolitan world-view. This world-view is primarily acquired by individuals with high levels of cognitive mobilization, that is, by individuals who through political discussions and exposure to the media, have developed the ability to identify with abstract, imagined communities such as the nation or Europe.

The empirical evidence for Inglehart's thesis is inconclusive. While Inglehart finds that there is indeed a positive correlation between national identity and European identity, Duchesne and Frognier (1995)

find no univocal relationship when using an item about national pride to reflect the respondents' degree of identification with their country and a broader set of countries than that used by Inglehart. Both Inglehart and Duchesne and Frognier, however, find a negative relationship between regional identity and European identity. Clearly more tests are needed, for neither Inglehart nor Duchesne and Frognier rely on valid indicators and complex statistical models.[7]

Nested identities

In order to further our theoretical understanding of the factors that contribute to variation in the degree of identification with Europe, we must go beyond Inglehart's useful and persuasive argument. We can accomplish this by noting that the explanation of the degree of identification with Europe and the study of the relationships between national and regional identities and European identity fall within the study of what are known as 'Nested identities'. Nested identities are lower- and higher-order identities such that the latter encompass the former. My identity as a resident in city 'a', is nested in my identity as resident of region 'A' – which includes city 'a' – which is in turn nested in my identity as resident of country 'Alpha', and so on.

The literature has tended to treat identities, including nested identities, as incompatible, as a matter of choice, even if this is not always explicitly stated. This assumption is discernible, for instance, in Inglehart's opposition between regional identities, which are taken to symbolize parochialism, and national and European identities, which are taken to symbolize cosmopolitanism. At the more theoretical level, it is implicit in Tajfel's and Turner's (Turner 1975; Tajfel 1981, 1982; Turner, Sachdev, and Hogg 1983) and Lawler's (1992) discussions of the factors that lead individuals to prefer one identity over another.

Turner and Tajfel devote much of their efforts to explaining why individuals identify with some groups rather than others. Their basic conclusions are that 1) individuals strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, 2) positive social identity is based on favourable comparisons with relevant out-groups, and 3) when social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals try to leave the group or make it more positively distinct.

Lawler focuses on nested groups and develops a theory to explain under what circumstances individuals will identify with a lower-order or a higher-order nested groups. He argues that individuals tend to identify with those units that provide them with a greater sense of control and therefore generate more positive emotions. In general, because of the greater salience of smaller groups, a 'proximal' rule tends to apply, such that individuals identify more with smaller groups than with bigger ones. Sometimes, however, a 'distal' rule applies, when the larger unit has

acquired the functions that allow it to provide better for the well-being of its members. This is especially likely 'when the larger group closely monitors or regulates subgroups' (Hechter 1987, in Lawler 1992, p. 334), 'when collective rituals and symbols are frequent enough to make the larger collectivity highly salient' (Collins 1975, in Lawler 1992, p. 334), and 'when social transformations create larger social units from smaller ones' (Watkins 1991, in Lawler 1992, p. 334).

The literature's emphasis on providing explanations for people's choices between identities contrasts with the fact that, empirically, individuals have multiple and situational identities. This is illustrated in Waters' study Ethnic Options (1990), where she shows that in the United States a large proportion of the population define themselves in terms of hyphenated identities, whether Mexican-Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, etc. Other studies that have explored the topic of peripheral nationalisms have also found that, when given the choice, individuals most often define themselves as both members of the national state and members of a particular region. In the case of Spain, for instance, the majority of Basque and Catalan residents define themselves as both Basques/Catalans and Spaniards (Díez Nicolás 1999). The intensity of their identification with one or the other group may differ, but individuals have been shown to be able to juggle different nested identities. It is therefore quite common for them to express surprise when they are asked as part of a survey to make a choice between a set of nested identities.

Inglehart's theory of European identity precludes the simultaneous survival of both local (e.g. regional) and larger identities (e.g. national and supranational). In contrast, Lawler's, Turner's and Tajfel's theories can potentially accommodate both, provided that one applies the theories' principles to the explanation of the strength of identification with specific groups rather than simply applying them, as they do, to the choice between identities. They also become more meaningful to the extent that one justifies simultaneous identification with various nested identities with the argument that identities can fulfil different and complementary functions. This focus on the different functions of group identities is a salient feature of Calhoun's and Brewer's theory of nested identities described below.

The relationship between regional and national identities and European identity

Recent work by Calhoun (1994) Brewer (1993, 1999) and Brewer and Gardner (1996) invokes the bidimensionality of ethnic identity – differentiation and inclusion/equivalence –.[8] In his survey of the literature on collective identities, Calhoun states that in any identity claim, two goals are sought, that of differentiation and that of equivalence. According to him, 'This is even so for the identity of the nation, which normally

involves a rhetoric of cultural difference yet is in large part a claim to equivalent standing with other nations' (Calhoun 1994, p. 25). By differentiating the goals of differentiation and equivalence, Calhoun opens the possibility that different identities may play different roles, some of them helping to differentiate individuals within groups of interaction and others contributing to making people feel that they belong to a community of equals. This is precisely the core of Brewer's argument, which, instead of distinguishing the differentiation and equivalence dimensions, distinguishes between a differentiation and an inclusion dimension. According to Brewer, in certain cases each of two nested identities represents one of the two dimensions: 'the superordinate identity satisfies the need for secure inclusion in a large collective, while the subgroup identity serves the need for distinctiveness within the larger social category' (Brewer, 1999, p. 190).

Following Calhoun's and Brewer's emphasis on the differentiating role of identities, we propose to revise the theories of identity choice summarized above and predict that lower-order or local identities will persist even when broader groups contribute more to an individual's positive social identity (as in Turner and Tajfel) or when more inclusive groups provide her/him with a greater sense of control (as in Lawler). In fact, in the Network Society (Castells 1996), a society in which the individual's sense of self is increasingly threatened by the forces of globalization, one would expect local identities, as mechanisms of differentiation, to gain as much strength as supranational identities, as mechanisms of inclusion.

One problem with Calhoun's and Brewer's theory of nested identities is its indeterminacy as to the relationship between lower-order and higher-order nested identities; that is, it does not specify whether, for instance, individuals who identify strongly with lower-order groups identify strongly or slightly with higher-order groups. Indeed, in their theoretical model the causal factors involved in the development of lower-order identities are not the same as those involved in the development of higher-order identities. For instance, a person who identifies strongly with his or her country because it makes him or her feel different in the midst of the anonymity of a global world may not necessarily identify with a more inclusive group: either because of this group's lack of salience or because this person does not think that the larger group provides him or her with a more positive social identity than that provided by the nation. This lack of elaboration narrows the scope of applicability of Calhoun's and Brewer's theory of nested identities, for as Duchesne and Frognier have shown, there is a great deal of empirical variation in the association between local and more encompassing identities that neither Inglehart's theory nor the theories of nested identities seem able to explain.

We propose to solve this problem by retaining Calhoun's and Brewer's emphasis on the two roles of group identity, differentiation and inclusion/equivalence, while at the same time recognizing that in some contexts

local and broader identities may be seen as impinging on each other; that is, that local identities can sometimes be perceived as setting obstacles to inclusion in broader groups whereas in other contexts broader identities may be perceived as threatening the survival of local identities. The perceived need in Germany to subsume national identity into a European identity at the end of World War II [WWII] is an example of how emphasis on a national identity can be construed to set obstacles to inclusion in a larger community, which for Germany was the community of nations. Whenever local and broader identities are seen as threatening each other, one may expect a negative relationship between lower-order and higher-order nested identities. Otherwise, given the potentially complementary character of nested identities, the relationship should be positive.

The hypothesis just outlined connects the problem of identification with Europe with the problem of the content of identities, whether national or European. This connection is discernable in Smith's work when he states that 'If we hold to a Romantic doctrine and view the nation as a seamless, organic cultural unit, then the contradiction *between national and European identities* becomes acute. If, on the other hand, we accept a more voluntaristic and pluralistic conception and regard the nation as a rational association of common laws and culture within a defined territory, then the contradiction is minimized. For in this version – which is the one generally accepted in Western countries – individuals may choose to which nation they wish to belong, and there is, as we shall see, room for competing focuses of identity. So the conflict between the claims of the nation and those of a looser European identity becomes more situational and pragmatic, even if in a political crisis it could never be eliminated' (1992, p. 56).

What Smith does not contemplate is the possibility that the content of European identity may be perceived differently by different individuals and across nations. We would like to supplement Smith's hypothesis by arguing that a European identity may be perceived as threatening national identity in some nations and not in others, not because of contrasts in the way national identity has been conceptualized but rather because of contrasts in the way the European identity itself has been constructed in each nation. That Europe may be conceptualized or imagined differently in different countries is indeed a very distinct possibility, precisely because of the relative insulation of the different European nations that, according to Smith, nation-specific school curricula and public spheres contribute (1992, pp. 72–73).

Hypotheses

In this article, we examine the different hypotheses outlined and developed above, with reference to the strength of regional, national and European identities in Spain. One of these hypotheses refers to *the*

strength of national and regional identities relative to the strength of European identity. Lawler would predict that regional and national identities are stronger than European identity, because Spain and the Region as locuses of identification are nearer to individuals than is Europe (proximal rule) and because most government functions are still vested in them rather than in Europe (the distal rule does not apply). Other hypotheses refer to the *individual factors that explain variation in the strength of identification with Europe*. Thus, Inglehart's Cognitive mobilization, Education and Postmaterialism theses predict that European identity will be stronger among individuals with high degrees of cognitive mobilization and education, and among postmaterialists. Meanwhile, Turner's and Tajfel's theory of social identity predicts that individuals who hold positive images of Europe will identify more with it than those whose views are negative; this should be so because presumably identifying with a group that is perceived positively results in a positive social identity. Finally, other hypotheses discussed above refer to the *expected relationships between regional and national identities, and European identity*. Thus, Inglehart predicts a negative relationship between regional and European identities and a positive relationship between national and European identities.

Meanwhile, our elaboration of Calhoun's and Brewer's theoretical discussions of nested identities predicts that the nature of the relationship between the strength of regional and national identities and European identity depends on whether or not Europe is framed as threatening national and regional identities. In the case of Spain, one would predict a positive relationship between regional and national identities and European identity because, as we describe below, Europe has not been framed in public discussions as a threat to either Spanish or regional identities. On the contrary, Europe and, more specifically, European integration have been depicted in positive terms and in a way that makes being European a distinctive dimension of Spain's national identity. This depiction of Europe in Spanish public discourse is the focus of the section below, which draws on the literature about Spain's role in the process of European integration and on a detailed examination of 194 newspaper lead and op-ed articles published between 1946 and 1997 in three of the largest Spanish newspapers, *ABC* (1946–1997; N = 113), *Cambio16* (1972–1975; N = 8), and *El País* (1976–1997; N = 73). The newspaper *ABC* has been chosen to examine the views of public intellectuals during the dictatorship of General Franco and, more generally, as representative of conservative views. The weekly magazine *Cambio16* has been chosen to represent progressive views at the end of the Franco Regime (1972–1975), when restrictions on freedom of the press were loosened. Finally, the newspaper *El País* has been chosen to represent progressive views after the death of Franco (1975) and the subsequent restoration of democracy in Spain. In terms of sales and of their role as

vehicles of the opinions of public intellectuals, all three were leading publications during the periods in which they have been analysed. We examine a randomly selected sample drawn from as complete a set as it was possible to assemble from newspaper collections in archives and libraries of all the lead and op-ed articles about European integration published between 1946 and 1997 in these publications. All the articles were coded twice: once by research assistants and once by one of the authors of this article. A questionnaire was then applied to each article, to measure what themes were mentioned in discussions of European integration, the European institutions, and Spain's relations with the European institutions.[9]

Spanish political and intellectual elites and European integration

In order to understand the relative ease with which a European identity has come to be compatible with a Spanish identity, one must begin by saying that anti-Europeanism played a role in Franco's nationalist discourse but only for a relatively short time following the end of WWII (García Pérez 1990).[10] The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), which brought Franco to power, resulted from major internal conflict of a social, territorial, and religious character (Brenan 1943; Thomas 1967; Carr 1982; Jackson 1995). In contrast to the leftist, decentralized, and secular character of the legitimate republican regime on which he declared war, Franco provided a defensive nationalist discourse that was anti-Communist, proclaimed the territorial integrity of Spain, and defined Spain as a Catholic state (Tamames 1976; Carr 1982; Payne 1987; Preston 1993). Because of the Regime's need for legitimacy, its international isolation, and the rise of the Communists in many European countries, this nationalist discourse very soon acquired defensive, autarkic and anti-European connotations (Anderson 1974; Backlanoff 1980).

   The beginning of the Cold War in the 1950s, which led to a warming of attitude by the Western Powers towards the Franco regime and the defeat of Communist parties in Western Europe, gradually eroded, however, the logic behind the anti-Europeanist discourse of the previous period. This discourse became even more inappropriate after 1957, when the failure of the autarkic economic policy practised since the end of the war forced Franco to adopt a package of liberalization reforms that opened Spain to the influence of the international, mostly European, markets (La Porte 1992; Alvarez-Miranda 1996). From now on, Franco allowed his most progressive Ministers to take steps towards the participation of Spain in the different international organizations that were being created in Europe. In 1962 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Castiella, sent a letter to the European Community [EC] in which he expressed the Spanish government's desire to start negotiations for

admission to the organization. The letter was not answered. There was no question of admission to the EC so long as Spain remained a non-democratic country. Despite this setback, mutual economic interest between Spain and the EC opened the way in later years to negotiations towards some form of economic association. These negotiations culminated in the commercial treaty of 1970, a very comprehensive treaty that greatly benefited Spain's economy (Alonso 1970, 1985).

Therefore, during the 1950s and 1960s a significant segment within Spain's political elite supported an end to Spain's isolation and a strengthening of economic relationships between Spain and the EC in order to close the wide gap that existed between the two (Moreno Juste 1990). Gradually, Europe came to be presented by members of the political, economic, and cultural elites as the model of economic well-being to which Spain should aspire.[11] This consensus is reflected in lead articles and op-ed pieces published in *ABC* between 1946 and 1962: not one of the articles sampled from these years opposed European integration or Spain's participation in it. Also, the narrowing of the gap between Spain and the EC became the mirror against which the success of Franco's economic policy was judged and, because of the spectacular economic growth rates achieved by Spain during the 1960s, an instrument for the legitimation of the dictatorial regime. There was therefore no pressure for Franco to undermine the idyllic image of Europe's economic well-being promoted by his ministers and the media, and reinforced by the experiences of Spanish emigrants in Europe and the interaction between Spaniards and the foreign tourists who began to spend their holidays in Spain.

What the Franco regime could not do was praise the political virtues of the European model or the modernity of its social and moral practices, for these contradicted the dictatorial character of the political regime and the conservative character of Spanish Catholicism. Thus, while the Franco regime contributed to the idealization of Western Europe as a model of economic progress, it stopped short of identifying with Western Europe's values and political institutions. In 1955, for instance, Alfredo Kindelán, close to the Franco regime, reacted against calls for Spain's Europeanization, saying what follows in an op-ed published by *ABC* (2.24.55; 'El espa ol y el europeo' [The Spaniard and the European]:

May the Almighty not allow such a thing. The culture that some Spaniards, who suffer from an inferiority complex, so naively observe and admire is afflicted with an exaggerated level of materialism that leads it to subordinate ideals to the attainment of wealth and the conquest of material goods and comfort; let's indeed join Europeans for the achievement of certain goals, especially for the defence of civilization, but without renouncing our personality.

Franco himself, in a speech delivered in Valencia, restated this by saying:

> . . . we feel European, but we are not going to jeopardize our internal well-being and our internal peace in an attempt to satisfy foreign demands. (6. 18. 1962, Secretaría General del Movimiento and Ministerio de Información y Turismo. 1975).

The slogan 'Espa a es diferente' (Spain is different), popularized by the government during the 1960s and 1970s, symbolized efforts by Spanish political and cultural elites to justify the Spanish political institutions and resist European values.

The description above shows that a symbolic merger between Spanish and European identity could not have resulted from conscious efforts by the Spanish ruling elite. This merger was, as we discuss in the following section, an unintended consequence of the ruling elite's attempts to integrate Spain in the European Economic Community [EEC] while maintaining its political and cultural distinctiveness, and of mobilization by democratic public intellectuals since the late 1960s, who gradually managed to equate European identity and pro-democratic, progressive, attitudes, and to construct the Francoist regime as anti-European.

The ruling elite's unsuccessful but persistent efforts to attain membership in the EEC for Spain resulted in these efforts and the EEC's subsequent objections being highly publicized and debated. Thus, between 1959 and 1985, 65 per cent of the sampled lead and op-ed articles about European integration published in *ABC*, *Cambio16*, and *El País* dealt with the relationship between Spain and the European Communities, and 48 per cent dealt specifically with negotiations with the EEC. The views expressed in these articles were unanimously favourable to EEC membership. They emphasized the economic benefits of the development of a common market (20 per cent of the articles) and the benefits both for Europe and Spain of creating a strong economic and political bloc (23 per cent of the articles). Two main arguments offered in lead and op-ed articles in favour of Spain's membership in the EEC were the need for Spain to abandon its traditional isolation by joining the European Communities (11 per cent) and the positive role that membership in the European Communities would play in the modernization of the country (8 per cent) (See Table 1; see also Appendix for the 1946–1997 period).

Support for Spain's membership in the EEC was in fact so resolute that difficulties and constant delays in the negotiations, both before and after the transition to democracy, led to occasional outbursts of wounded pride in which Spain's European identity was emphasized:

> Spain – whether they like it or not. . . . – is as European as France,

Table 1. *Positive and negative descriptive or evaluative comments about European Integration in Spanish Lead and Op-Ed articles, 1959–1985 %*

	Spain
Common Market (P)	20.4 (22)
CAP (N)	6.5 (7)
Strong Bloc (P)	23.1 (25)
Governance (N)	11.1 (12)
Isolation (P)	11.1 (12)
Modernization (P)	8.3 (9)
Peace (P)	4.6 (5)
Struc/Reg Fund (P)	0.9 (1)
N=	108

(P): Positive Mention; (N): Negative Mention

Notes: Common Market: The Common Market is economically beneficial*; CAP: The Common Agricultural Policy is a bad policy;* Strong Bloc: States are too small to face economic or military challenges; *Governance: The governance of European institutions is poor*; Isolation: Membership of this country is necessary to break the country's isolation, isolation would be disadvantageous for the country; Modernization: The country will modernize as a member of European institutions; Peace: Will contribute to Peace; Struc/Reg Fund: The Structural and Regional Funds of the European institutions are a good thing.

Germany, and Italy. . . . The Europe of the Communities, the one that recently undertook the unifying task by building on efforts to overcome a deep crisis through the pooling and balancing of resources and economic, technical, demographic, ideological, and defensive means, carried within it, hidden in its well armoured frame, a disdainful sentiment toward everything Spanish (*ABC*, J.M. Alfaro, "Los desdenes de Europa", 3.9.78).

Spain is not waiting to become part of Europe, since it already is part of Europe. And a founding nation, indeed, of everything European (*ABC*, Lead article, 1.31.85).

. . . If Europe, more concerned with problems of quartering than with continental solidarity and unity around a glorious cultural past and around a future defined by liberal and democratic ideals, intended to sign a treaty that would be humiliating and disadvantageous for our country, Spain would still have plenty of alternatives in the rest of the world . . . whatever people may say, Europe is incomplete without the Iberian Peninsula (*El País*, "La bofetada europea", 9.18.79).

Thus, the European Communities gradually became an obsession for successive Spanish governments and for public commentators. Ironically, in the 1980s, at the end of the negotiations, membership in the European

Communities had moved from being portrayed as a right to which Spain was entitled, to a test of Spain's European credentials. Since Western Europe was Spain's model, only its political leaders, gathered around the EC, were seen as the legitimate judges of the extent to which Spain had done its homework well. For instance, a lead article published in *El País* on 4.12.83 emphasized that 'Spain's application to become a member of the EEC has always been guided by a double goal, political and economic. The goal of having its institutions recognized by the European democracies went hand in hand with the goal of inserting our economy in a market formed by developed countries.' ('Atenas y el ingreso de España en el Mercado Común' [Athens and Spain's membership in the Common Market]).[12]

The last quote above, which stresses the role that membership in the EEC played in sanctioning the democratic character of Spanish institutions, allows us to move to the second fact that contributed to the merger of the Spanish and European identities during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, it evokes the triple role that democracy played in the gradual identification of Spaniards with Europe: It was an obstacle to Spain's membership in the European Communities during the Franco regime, a goal pursued by the movement of opposition to Franco in the 1960s and 1970s, and an achievement in which Spaniards took substantial pride in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The fact that the European Communities opposed Spain's 1962 application for membership because it was not a democracy transformed the negotiations with the EEC into a political weapon that could be used by the movement of opposition to Franco. Despite limited freedom of the press, discussions of European integration became the vehicle for more-or-less open discussions about the lack of democratic institutions under Franco. Lead and op-ed articles of the 1960s and 1970s illustrate this gradual merge of the debate about democracy and the debate about membership in the EEC. Indeed, 42 per cent of the 43 sampled lead and op-ed articles on European integration published between 1959 and the end of 1976 (when political reform towards democracy was approved) discussed the connection between democracy and membership in the EEC. These articles display a trend from initial opposition to impatient demands for a democratic transformation of Spain's political structures. In fact, from 1972 on, all sampled lead and op-ed articles in *ABC*, *Cambio16* and *El País* that discussed the link between democracy and membership in the EEC called for this transformation.[13]

The fact that lead and op-ed articles about European integration increasingly called for a democratic transformation reflects the greater freedom of the press that characterized the late phase of the Franco regime. Those who initially made these calls were politicians who, because of their moderate democratic views and high social status, were able to express their views in newspapers like *ABC* without any fear of

repression. This is the case of José María de Areilza, an erudite Basque aristocrat. As a youth, he travelled extensively and became proficient in several languages. Despite serving as Mayor of Bilbao during the II Spanish Republic, he managed to avoid repression under Franco and was even named Ambassador to Argentina, the United States and France. A convinced Europeanist, he wrote numerous articles in *ABC* during the 1960s that called, directly or indirectly, for democratic reform in order to facilitate Spain's membership in the EEC. Soon after Franco's death, he became Foreign Affairs Minister. In the early 1970s, people like Areilza were joined by progressive intellectuals like González Seara (founding member of *Cambio16* and Minister of Education under the UCD government after the restoration of democracy), who despite their more modest origins and less cosmopolitan socialization sensed the potential political role that the topic of European integration could play in their strategy to erode the legitimacy of Franco's regime.

The democratic movement of opposition presented the Western European democracies as the political, social, and cultural model to imitate, and in its attacks on the dictatorship, capitalized on the fact that Spain could never be like or a part of Europe until it was a fully-fledged democracy. Later, during the democratic transition, lead and op-ed articles appearing mostly in the centre-left newspaper *El País* began to construct the political Right and Left as representing isolationism and openness respectively; also, they portrayed Spanish history since King Phillip II as dominated by an isolationist and traditionalist mentality that the modern Spanish democratic left was now set to subvert.[14] In sum, the messages transmitted by the democratic opposition stressed that to be democratic meant to be European and to be European meant to be open to foreign influence, to be modern, and to be democratic. At the same time, Spain's membership in the European Communities came to symbolize breaking with the non-democratic, traditionalist, and isolationist past; it meant to become modern, open and democratic. Nothing better expresses the positive image of the European integration process, of membership in the European Union, and of the fusion of Spanish and European identity expressed in public discourse than the following excerpt from the King of Spain's 1992 Christmas address:

We are in Europe and in Europe we shall remain because we are Europe, because Europe needs us. We will thus become more and more integrated in it, without obsession or haste but conscious about the fact that we must proceed along this path with confident and prudent steps. We must persist in this effort because the modern world needs Europe and, also, because Europe's process towards unity will not be halted, regardless of obstacles that seem at first, like on other historical occasions, insurmountable. These are to be expected in such

an ambitious and many-faceted enterprise. *The fact of belonging to Europe enriches our national identity* (Discursos 1996).

Public discourse has thus depicted European integration and Spain's membership in the EU as positive developments and as not impinging on the Spanish and – for that matter – the different regions' identities. In fact, only two (1.5 per cent) sampled lead or op-ed articles commented on the potentially negative impact of European integration on Spain's or its regions' identities (see Appendix).[15] Partly because of this, Spaniards do not see a great incompatibility between their regional and national identities and European identity. Thus, a national representative survey conducted in March 1999 by ASEP, a renowned survey research institution in Spain, showed that 56 per cent of the respondents believe that it is unlikely or very unlikely that the process of European integration will have a negative impact on the Spanish or their region's identities, compared to 33 per cent who believed it will. In an open-ended question, in which respondents had to list those aspects of the idea of European integration that they did not like, only 3 per cent mentioned the fact that it erodes national identity. Therefore, a large proportion of those who believe European integration will have a negative impact on national identity do not seem to be very concerned about it. This finding contradicts generalizations about the supposed fear that Europeans have of losing their national identity as a result of European integration (Kourvetaris 1987, p. 133; Habermas 1996, p. 7). This diagnostic may apply to some countries but does not seem to apply to Spain, where citizens, according to most surveys, are neither excessively bothered about enhancing the political dimension of the EU nor too worried about losing their national identity.

Based on the results reported in this section, one would expect that in Spain and its regions there is a positive relationship between national identity and European identity. The following section tests the applicability to the Spanish case of the different hypotheses outlined in the theoretical sections of this article.

Analysis

To test the hypotheses outlined in previous sections, we rely on survey-data collected in March 2000, by ASEP (Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos) from a national representative sample of Spain's adult population (N = 1200), based on a questionnaire drafted by one of the authors of this article.

Dependent Variable: Identification with Europe (EUROID)

To measure the degree of identification with Europe, we have used a ten-point scale based on which respondents had to express the strength of their identification as Europeans.

Independent Variables:

a. Identification with Spain (SPAIN) and with the Autonomous Community (REGION)

The degrees of identification with Spain and with the respondents' regions have been measured with a ten-point scale, based on which respondents had to express the strength of their identification as Spaniards and as members of their Autonomous Community respectively.

b. Images of Europe (IMAGE)

According to Kelman (1965), an 'image' is the structured representation of an object in a person's cognitive system. Following Hewstone (1986), we have constructed an index that summarizes the political, economic, and social images, positive or negative, that respondents have of Europe. Respondents were asked to what extent a series of attributes apply to Europe. These qualities were highly competitive firms, good labour conditions, political corruption, social justice, and a good way of life. The standardized scores for these variables were added to form an index such that the higher the value, the more positive the images (that respondents have) of Europe. The lowest correlation coefficient between the different components of the index and the index itself has a value equal to 0.4.

c. Cognitive Mobilization (COGMOB)

To measure the respondents' degree of cognitive mobilization, we used a question that asked respondents how often they read international news in the newspapers. The answer categories are 'Never', 'Almost Never', 'Sometimes', 'Frequently', and 'Very Frequently'.

d. Postmaterialism (POSTMAT)

ASEP's questionnaire included Inglehart's classic 4-item battery of items on Postmaterialist/Materialist values. Respondents were asked to rank four objectives according to the effort that they thought the government should put into achieving them in the next ten years. The objectives are 'Maintaining Order in the Nation', 'Giving the People more Say in Important Political Decisions', 'Fighting Rising Prices' and 'Protecting Freedom of Speech'. The first and the third items represent Materialist objectives, whereas the second and fourth represent Postmaterialist objectives. The index has three values. We assigned the highest value to those respondents who chose two Postmaterialist choices as their first and second choices and the lowest value to those who chose two Materialist choices as their first and second choices. We assigned the middle value to the rest of the respondents who answered the question. In the statistical analysis, we have decomposed the index into two dummy variables.

e. Education (EDUC)

We have included Education as a control variable and also because Inglehart's argument predicts more educated respondents to be more open to abstract ideas such as European integration and European

identity. The variable contains eight values, ranging from 'No schooling, Does not Know how to Read', to 'College and Graduate Education'.

Results

The relative strength of regional, national, and European identities

The results reported in Table 2 show that respondents in this sample identify most with Spain (Mean = 7.9), followed by their Autonomous Community (Mean = 7.7), and last with Europe (Mean = 6.3). The results on identification with Spain are slightly lower than those obtained by Bollen and Díez Medrano with another sample from 1992 (Bollen and Díez Medrano 1998), and in a survey conducted by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* in 1994, which asked respondents to rate on a ten-point scale how strongly they felt Spanish (8.5 and 8.6 respectively). In both cases, however, the ranking of Regional, Spanish, and European identification was the same.

Explaining identification with Europe

Table 3 presents multiple regression results corresponding to a model that reflects the different explanations that have been provided for individual variation in the degree of identification with Europe. The model explains 33 per cent of the variance in identification with Europe. All the effects are statistically significant, except for the one corresponding to POSTMAT. The coefficient for IMAGE indicates that, all other variables being held constant, the more positive the images of Europe are, the stronger the degree of identification with Europe. The positive co-efficient for COGMOB reflects the fact that, all other variables being held constant, the greater the degree of cognitive mobilization, the greater the identification with Europe. The positive coefficient for EDUC indicates that, all other variables being held constant, the higher the level of education, the stronger the degree of identification with Europe. Finally, the positive coefficients for SPAIN and REGION

Table 2. *Descriptive statistics for the variables 'Regional Identity', 'Spanish Identity', and 'European Identity'*

	Mean	Median	IQ Range
REGION	7.7	8	4
SPAIN	7.9	8	3
EUROPE	6.3	6	3

N = 690
Source: Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos, y Políticos (ASEP) (2000)

indicate that, all other variables being held constant, the stronger the degree of identification with Spain or with the Autonomous Community, the stronger the degree identification with Europe.

The results presented in Table 3 change little when one changes the operationalization of some variables or adds new variables, such as age, expected benefits of European integration, an index of cosmopolitan experiences based on the respondents' language skills and travel experiences, an index measuring how much Spanish respondents like people from the different countries of the EU, and dummy variables for Catalonia and the Basque Country, where peripheral nationalism is strongest (see also, Díez Medrano 1995).[16]

Discussion and conclusion

The statistical analysis presented above supports some hypotheses and sheds doubt on others. As Lawler would predict, among Spaniards national identity is stronger than European identity. Also, consistent with Lawler's theory of affective attachments, regional identity is stronger than is European identity. Inglehart's hypotheses about the roles of levels of cognitive mobilization, education and postmaterialism in explaining the strength of European identity are only partially supported. Like Janssen, we find that the Cognitive mobilization thesis is more robust than is the Postmaterialism thesis. One could argue that postmaterialists no longer see European integration as primarily concerned with peace and cultural understanding. Rather, they may see the process as a purely materialist enterprise that has distanced itself from

Table 3. *The effects of Cognitive mobilization, Education, Postmaterialism, images of Europe, Regional identity, and Spanish identity, on identification with Europe*

	Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)
Cognitive Mobilization (COGMOB)	0.20* (0.07)
Level of Education (EDUC)	0.17* (0.02)
Postmaterialists vs. Other	–0.09 (0.19)
Materialists vs. Other	–0.37 (0.20)
Images of Europe (IMAGE)	0.07* (0.02)
Identification with Region (REGION)	0.23* (0.04)
Identification with Spain (SPAIN)	0.43* (0.04)
Constant	0.09 (0.38)

R-Square: 34%; Adjusted R-Square: 33%
N = 690 *: Significant at .05 level, two-sided
Source: Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos, y Políticos (ASEP) (2000)

its original goals. Turner's and Tajfel's social identity theory is also sup-
ported by the data. The more positive images of Europe are, the greater
the degree of identification with Europe.

One crucial experiment to determine the relative merits of alternative
explanations of European identity in this article is the estimation of the
relationship between identification with the nation and identification
with Europe and between identification with the region and identifi-
cation with Europe. In Spain, people who identify strongly with Spain
or/and with their region also identify strongly with Europe. Spaniards
have thus developed a sort of hyphenated identity with respect to
Europe. This result agrees with both Inglehart's prediction and with
Calhoun's and Brewer's theory of nested identities. Contrary to what
Inglehart predicts, however, there is a positive relationship between
regional identity and European identity.

The only hypothesis that is consistent with the statistical associations
between regional and national identities and European identity is
Calhoun's and Brewer's theory about the dual role of identities.
Calhoun's and Brewer's theory, however, simply says that nested iden-
tities are in principle compatible, for they each fulfil a different function.
It does not elaborate under what circumstances they are compatible and
under what circumstances they are incompatible. In this article, we have
argued that this depends on how both the lower-order and higher-order
identities have been constructed; if lower-order or higher-order identi-
ties are constructed in a way that is perceived as threatening other lower-
order or higher-order identities, then they will be incompatible. In Spain,
public discourse has not framed the Spanish, the regional and the
European identities as incompatible; in particular, it has framed
European identity in a very positive way and as not threatening national
or regional identities. Because of this, there are positive relationships
between national and regional identities and European identity.

Duchesne and Frognier's empirical analysis (1995) has shown that
the relationship between the degree of identification with the nation
and the degree of identification with Europe is positive in some coun-
tries and negative in others. Further research should determine
whether our elaboration of Brewer's and Calhoun's theory leads to
accurate predictions about the relationships between regional,
national, and European identities in other countries; that is, whether
positive relationships are observed in countries where the European
identity has not been framed as impinging on national and regional
identities, whereas negative relationships are observed in countries
where it has been framed as a threat to them. Also, our detailed
examination of the Spanish case has provided a historico-political
explanation of the process that led to European integration being por-
trayed in a positive light and as not threatening local and national iden-
tities. The examination of other cases should reveal whether a more

formal set of hypotheses can be formulated about the factors that contribute, in the context of European integration and in other contexts, to nested identities being constructed as compatible or as impinging on each other.

APPENDIX *Positive and Negative Descriptive or Evaluative Comments about European Integration in Spanish Lead and Op-Ed articles, 1946–1997 %*

	Spain
Understanding (P)	1.0 (2)
Common Market (P)	14.9 (29)
CAP (N)	4.6 (9)
Dem. Deficit (N)	1.5 (3)
Strong Bloc (P)	21.1 (41)
Governance (N)	12.9 (25)
Isolation (P)	8.8 (17)
Voice (N)	1.0 (2)
Modernization (P)	5.2 (10)
Rem. Barriers (P)	1.0 (2)
Soc. Benefits (P)	0.5 (1)
Sov/Identity(N)	1.5 (3)
Calm Fears (P)	–
Peace (P)	5.2 (10)
Free Movt. And Competition (N)	–
Struc/Reg Fund (P)	5.7 (11)
N =	194

(P): Positive Mention; (N): Negative Mention

Notes: Understanding: Contributes to better understanding between peoples and cultures; Common Market: The Common Market is economically beneficial; CAP: The Common Agricultural Policy is a bad policy; Dem.Deficit: European institutions suffer from a democratic deficit; Strong Bloc: States are too small to face economic or military challenges; Governance: The governance of European institutions is poor; Isolation: Membership of this country is necessary to break the country's isolation, isolation would be disadvantageous for the country; Voice: The country's voice is not taken into account within European institutions; Modernization: The country will modernize as a member of European institutions; Rem.Barriers: The removal of barriers to the movement of people is a good thing; Soc. Benefits: The Country's social benefits will increase as a result of membership in the European institutions; Sov/Identity: Membership in the European Union has or will have a negative effect on sovereignty and identity; Calm Fears: Membership in the European institutions will reduce misgivings towards the country; Peace: Will contribute to Peace; Free Movt. And Competition: Free movement of workers will mean competition from foreign workers; Struc/Reg Fund: The Structural and Regional Funds of the European institutions are a good thing.

Notes

1.   For descriptions of these attempts and for criticisms of the intentions of the original proponents of the concept of European citizenship and of the definition of citizenship on which these proposals were based see Kolsowski (1999) and Weiler (1997). For discussions about the ways in which an emergent European citizenship already manifests itself, see Meehan (1993).

2.   If we understand by unifying 'national ethic' the sharing of values that distinguish Europe from other areas of the world, Inglehart provides plenty of evidence supporting the fact that this European 'national ethic' already exists (Inglehart 1997, ch. 3, p. 98).

3.   'In this respect, national identifications possess distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They are vivid, accessible, well-established, long popularized, and still widely believed, in broad outline at least. In each of these respects, 'Europe' is deficient both as idea and as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past – a 'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth (Smith 1992, p. 63); also 'For until the great majority of Europeans, the great mass of the middle and lower classes, are ready to imbibe these European messages in a similar manner and to feel inspired by them to common action and community, the edifice of 'Europe' at the political level will remain shaky (Smith 1992, p. 73).

4.   Major empirical studies about European integration that have focused on support for European integration but not on identification with Europe have been conducted by Inglehart (1977), Hewstone (1986), Eichenberg and Dalton (1991), Sinnott (1995), Wessels (1995), Deflem and Pempel (1996), Gabel (1998).

5.   E.g. the use of a knowledge question about the EU as part of the construct of cognitive mobilization. Knowledge of EU affairs may be seen both as a cause and an effect of support for European integration and European Identity.

6.   For instance, he claims that multivariate analysis shows that cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism are, together with nationality, the most important predictors of European identity, after holding several social background variables (education, income, age, and community size) constant, but the quantitative results of this analysis are not reported in the article.
To strengthen his analysis, he could have explored whether the effect of cognitive mobilization is smaller in countries such as Great Britain, where the media are more critical of European integration, than in other countries. He could have also explored whether the effect of Postmaterialism becomes smaller over time, as European integration came to be seen less as a vehicle towards peace than as a way of achieving quite materialistic economic goals.

7.   Researchers on European integration have generally been prisoners of the limitations of some of the indicators used in their source of data of choice, the Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the European Commission. As far as the measurement of European identity goes, until the late 1970s the Eurobarometer relied on a question that asked respondents to indicate the two geographic units they identified with the most. The units included were 1. the locality or town where they live; 2. the county or region where they live; 3. their country; 4. Europe, and 5. the world. This is not a very valid indicator of the strength of European identity, since it measures relative rather than absolute strength. Since the early 1980s, the Eurobarometer has included a question that more directly measures the degree of identification with Europe, by asking people how often they think of themselves as Europeans. Although the wording is awkward, since identity is not something about which one usually thinks, it probably serves to adequately differentiate individuals according to their degree of identification with Europe.
To measure national identity, scholars have relied on an even shakier indicator included in the Eurobarometer, which is how proud people are of being [country nationality]. Pride and Identification are two clearly different concepts. One can strongly feel Spanish without necessarily being proud of Spain or of being Spanish. Moreover, the question about pride

does not make sense if the person does not feel Spanish; it presupposes that respondents see themselves as part of the country to which the question refers (see Bollen and Díez Medrano 1998, for a discussion and measurement of different dimensions of group attachment).

Finally, the only indicator of regional identity that scholars who rely on the Eurobarometers have used is the one described above, where respondents have to choose the two geographic units with which they identify the most. It is thus subject to the same types of limitations.

8.   Weiler also makes this distinction, using the terms 'belongingness' and 'originality' (1997, p. 504).

9.   The literature shows that elites play a significant, albeit indirect, role in shaping public opinion by providing the arguments that citizens use when justifying to themselves and to others why they support or oppose particular issues (Deutsch 1968; Rosenau 1961); in connection with European integration, see R. Dalton and R. Duval (1981); Wessels, B. (1995), Anderson, Ch. (1998).

10.   The author traces the transition among Spanish nationalist intellectuals from an anti-European to a pro-European ideology in the years following the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and stresses the role that the Nazi ideological conception of a 'New Europe' played in this transition.

11.   On Franco's own views, see: Interview published in the NYT on 3.19. 1957; speech in Valencia on 18 June 1962; New Year's address on 12.30.1962 (Secretaría General del Movimiento and Ministerio de Información y Turismo 1975 *Pensamiento político de Franco: Antología*, Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento).

For a reasoned perspective by the economic elite, see, for instance, the views of one of its main organizations: Circulo de Economía. 1974. *La opción europea para la economía espa ola: libro blanco sobre las repercusiones económicas de la integración de Espa a en las Comunidades Europeas*. Madrid: Guadiana de Publicacions.

12.   Other articles that stressed this topic were 'Europa, a pesar de todo' [Europe, despite everything] (6.13.80) and 'Espa a es Europa' [Spain is Europe] (11.6.95), a lead article that summarized ten years of membership in the European Union [then called European Communities or Community].

13.   The following articles opposed or were ambiguous about the need for democratic changes: 'Las Europas' [The Europes] (Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *ABC*, 1.17.68); 'Espa a y el mercado común: una negociación despolitizada' [Spain and the Common Market; a depoliticized negotiation] (Lead article, *ABC*, 7.28.68); 'Espa a y el mercado común europeo' [Spain and the European Common Market] (Eduardo Adsuara, *ABC*, 8.10.68). The following articles were favourable to democratic changes: 'El mercado común y Espa a' [The common market and Spain] (José de Yanguas Messía, *ABC*, 8.23.62); 'La primera década' [The first decade] (J. M. de Areilza, *ABC*, 7.13.67); 'Con Europa al fondo' [With Europe in the Background] (Lead article, *ABC*, 8.11.68); 'Acercarse a Europa' [To come close to Europe] (J. M. Areilza, *ABC*, 1.14.70); 'Espa a y la comunidad europea' [Spain and the European Community] (Federico Silva, *ABC*, 10.17.72); 'Espa a y el mercado común' [Spain and the Common Market] (Lead article, *ABC,* 1.1.72); 'La dama de las cebollas' [The Lady of the Onions] (J. M. Pemán, *ABC*, 3.1.72); 'La libertad y Europa' [Liberty and Europe] (*ABC*, 3.11.72); 'La Europa del mercado común' [The Common Market Europe] (El Conde de Montarco, *ABC*, 5.16.73); 'Europa a la vista' [Europe in sight] (L. González Seara, *Cambio16*, 1972); 'Europa, patria querida' [Europe, Beloved Homeland] (Lead article, *Cambio16*, 8.21.1972); 'Los condicionamientos del mercado común' [The Constraints of the Common Market] (L. González Seara, *Cambio16*, 11.20.72); 'Ya veremos' [We will see] (Lead article, *Cambio16*, 1.1.75); 'La reforma política ante el mercado común') [The political reform faced with the Common Market] (Lead article, *El País*, 6.16.76); 'Europa y la democracia espa ola' [Europe and Spain's Democracy] (Lead article, *El País*, 9.24.76).

14.   See 'Hacia Europa' [Toward Europe] (*ABC*, 3.28.82); 'Espa a-CEE: basta de

prórrogas' [Spain-EEC – enough delays] (*El País*, 7.2.77); 'Espa a, en el Consejo de Europa' [Spain, in the Council of Europe] (*El País*, 11.24.77); 'Atenas y el ingreso de Espa a en el Mercado Común' [Athens and Spain's membership in the Common Market] (*El País*, 4.12.83).

15.   This percentage contrasts with 8.5 per cent obtained for Great Britain for the same period, based on a sample of lead and op-ed articles published in *The Economist* and *The New Statesman* and analysed using the same selection and coding procedures as for the Spanish articles (N = 211). The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Chi-Square test).

16.   The same results are obtained when instead of estimating a multiple regression model one estimates a logit model, using the median for the dependent variable (6) as the cut-off point. The corresponding logit coefficients are: COGMOB (0.32*), EDUC (0.20*), PMAT (–0.18), MAT (–0.50), IMAGE (0.12*), REGION (0.23*), SPAIN (0.41*). Chi-Square, with 7 DF is 182.47*. Note: * = Sig. At .05 level.

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