Public Choice Theory and the Russian Food Ban

• Název práce v češtině: Teorie public choice a ruský zákaz dovozu potravin
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Public Choice Theory and the Russian Food Ban
• Klíčová slova: Sankce; teorie veřejné volby; jídlo; zemědělský obchod; geoekonomie; ekonomické statky; Hufbauer; Kaempfer a Lowenberg; Rusko
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Sanctions; public choice theory; food; agricultural trade; geoeconomics; economic statecraft; Hufbauer; Kaempfer and Lowenberg; Russia
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2017/2018
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra ruských a východoevropských studií (23-KRVS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: Mgr. Karel Svoboda, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 16.05.2018
• Datum zadání: 16.05.2018
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 17.06.2019 09:30
• Místo konání obhajoby: Jinonice - U Kříže 8, Praha 5, J2066, Jinonice - místn. č. 2066
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 10.05.2019
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 17.06.2019
• Oponenti: Filipa Figueira, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

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Předběžná náplň práce

Diplomová práce se zabývá ekonomickým státnictvím a analyzuje, proč sankce přetrvávají i přesto, že selhávají, a proč je země nadále využívají navzdory jejich diskutabilnímu úspěchu. Hufbauer et. al. (2009) například ukazují, že sankce jsou úspěšné pouze ve 34 % případů, zatímco Pape (1997) tvrdí, že pouze v 5 %. Přesto však ekonomické státnictví zažívá obrození pod názvem „geoekonomika“. Diplomová práce vychází z Kaempferovi a Lowenbergovi „Public Choice“ (1988) teorie mezinárodních ekonomických sankcí. Práce předjímá, že v určitých případech jsou hlavním cílem sankcí národní zájmy, a proto by měly být hlavním hlediskem při posuzování úspěchu či neúspěchu sankcí. Diplomová práce zkoumá ruské embargo na dovoz potravin, uvalené v roce 2014 a ukazuje, že ačkoliv nedosáhlo žádných mezinárodních cílů, je velmi úspěšné v prosazování národního cíle podpory ruského zemědělství. Důsledkem tohoto závěru je, že současný kvantitativní výzkum ekonomických sankcí potenciálně chybně vyhodnotil sankce jako neúspěšné, protože je neanalyzoval na základě jejich skutečných cílů. Další výzkum v této oblasti s cílem zjistit, jak často jsou sankce používány především z domácích důvodů, ale i sankce, kde domácí cíl má jen druhořadý význam, je třeba na ně stále ještě reagovat.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

In this thesis I look at economic statecraft and try to examine why sanctions continue when they are failing, and why countries continue to use them despite debatable claims for success. For example, Hufbauer et. al.’s 2009 analysis shows sanctions only work 34% of the time, Pape (1997) estimates only 5%. Despite this economic statecraft is having a resurgence under the name “geoeconomics”. This thesis builds off Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s 1988 “Public Choice” theory of international economic sanctions. It hypothesises that in certain cases the domestic interests will be the primary goal of sanctions and therefore should be the primary focus of judging the success or failure of sanctions. Russia’s 2014 food import ban is analysed to show that, despite failure to achieve any international goals, it is being successful at achieving the domestic goal of supporting Russian agriculture. The implications being that all current quantitative analysis of economic sanctions have potentially incorrectly measured sanctions as failures by not measuring them against the actual goals of the policies. Further research into this area to establish just how often sanctions are used primarily for domestic reasons, but even sanctions where domestic goals are only of secondary importance, their existence still needs to be reflected upon.