Israeli Precision Strikes after the Second Intifada: On Target or Missing the Mark?

• Název v anglickém jazyce: Israeli Precision Strikes after the Second Intifada: On Target or Missing the Mark?
• Klíčová slova: Izrael, Druhá Intifáda, cíleného zabíjení, protiterorismus, Mossad
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Israel, Second Intifada, targeted killing, counterterrorism, Mossad
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2014/2015
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra mezinárodních vztahů (23-KMV)
• Vedoucí / školitel: prof. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, Ph.D., M.A.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 17.12.2014
• Datum zadání: 17.12.2014
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 23.06.2015 00:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: IPS FSV UK, U kříže 8/661 158 00 Praha 5 – Jinonice
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 15.05.2015
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 23.06.2015
• Oponenti: prof. PhDr. RNDr. Nikola Hynek, Ph.D., M.A.

Zásady pro vypracování

Topic: Israeli Defense Force Targeted Killings before and after the Second Intifada.

Thesis: The targeting of suspected and known terrorist leaders and high value targets (HVTs) as part of an overall counterterror and counterinsurgency strategy is not a new phenomenon in Israel. Indeed, the state of Israel has utilized targeted killings, hereinafter referred to as precision strikes, as a means to reduce the terrorist threat and eliminate would be aggressors to the State in large part since the State’s inception in 1948. However, much has changed over the years. Following far-reaching changes made to Israel’s policy of precision strikes during and after the Second Intifada, it is necessary to examine if these policy changes have resulted in an increase or decrease in success in terms of reducing the terrorist threat to Israel.

1. Introduction: Precision strikes, although controversial on both moral and legal grounds, have long been a tool of government statecraft used to eliminate suspected and know terrorist leaders and high value targets (HVTs) in an attempt to preempt and prevent future terrorist attacks and disrupt the activities of terrorist organizations. Precision strike as a counterterrorism strategy falls within the broader category of leadership decapitation theory, which suggests that terrorist organizations are prone to dissolution when individuals holding positions of leadership, or skills which are not readily transferable to their successors (such as a skilled bomb maker), are removed.
The theoretical framework of this thesis will begin by examining leadership decapitation theory in its broader context within the field of counterterrorism studies. The study of Israeli decapitation theory will then be expanded upon and conclude with an examination of Israel’s past and present policy of precision strike.

2. History: Although never overtly admitting to utilizing precision strikes as a measure of its counterterrorism policy prior to the Second Intifada, Israel has a long history of actively targeting terrorist leaders and HVTs which it deems a threat to its security. One of the most well-known examples of this is Operation Wrath of God, in which several teams of Israeli intelligence officers with varying degrees of operational autonomy were dispatched to Europe and Lebanon to eliminate terrorist targets suspected and known to have had a hand in planning and executing the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre in which 11 Israeli hostages were kidnapped and subsequently murdered. Further instances in the 1980s and 1990s include the targeting of several high ranking political and military leaders with the PLO, Hezbollah and Hamas. Fast-forward to the twenty first century and precision strikes remain a key element of Israeli counterterrorism policy; however, during the Second Intifada a number of key changes to its policy were implemented and will serve as the problem discussion of this thesis.

3. Problems: Examining Israeli precision strike policy is important for three primary reasons:

a. During the Second Intifada, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) announced the adoption of an overt precision strike policy to eliminate targets which were deemed impossible to capture for arrest and trial. This move was contrary to the previous policy of covert precision strikes used only under exceptional circumstances, which were never officially confirmed or denied by Israeli policy makers. The overt recognition of such a policy meant that precision strikes would now be codified into law and serve as a cornerstone for targeting individuals deemed to pose a security threat to the state of Israel.

b. Prior to the Second Intifada, precision strikes carried out by the IDF closely resembled the methods employed by the terrorists they sought to target (i.e. small caliber arms and controlled explosive devices were used to eliminate targets). However, during the Second Intifada a transition to more overt means of targeting took place which saw a sharp increase in the utilization of heavy explosives deployed by fighter jets, helicopter gunships and unmanned aerial vehicles, which were often deployed in densely populated urban areas, thus increasing the potential for collateral damage.

c. Prior to the Second Intifada, precision strikes primarily targeted high ranking military and political officials, terrorist activists ranking high in their respective organizations, or individuals who possessed a non-transferable skillset (i.e. nuclear scientists, skilled bomb makers etc.). However, during the Second Intifada and continuing to-date, a trend of targeting mid-ranking terrorist activists has been apparent which requires consistently removing individuals as they step up to fill positions of leadership once held by their predecessors.

4. Objective: Using a longitudinal case study as a research approach, the aim of this thesis is to analyze and assess Israel’s policy of precision strike both before and after the Second Intifada in an attempt to determine if changes made to the policy during the Second Intifada have resulted in a more successful counterterrorism campaign in terms of removing top leadership, reducing retaliatory strikes, and avoiding civilian casualties in the form of collateral damage. The exact number of cases to be examined, as well as the method of analysis to determine the success of an operation, will be discussed and agreed upon with Prof. Bureš.

1.7 Thesis Structure

2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Leadership Decapitation Theory
2.2 Why Leaders Matter
2.3 Previous Studies on Leadership Decapitation Effectiveness
2.4 Policy Merits for Targeting Leaders
2.5 Policy Arguments against Targeting Leaders
2.6 High Value Targeting: Beyond Targeting Leaders
3. Precision Strike in Israel
3.1 Decapitation Theory in Israeli Counterterrorism Policy
3.2 Israel’s Policy of Precision Strikes
3.3 Israeli Precision Strikes: 1970-1999
3.4 Israeli Precisions Strikes: 2000-2012
3.5 The Changing Nature of Israeli Precision Strike Policy
4. Data Analysis
4.1 Cases Prior to the Second Intifada
4.2 Cases After the Second Intifada
5. Results
5.1 Cases Prior to the Second Intifada
5.2 Cases After the Second Intifada
6. Discussion
7. Conclusion
7.1 Conclusion
7.2 Limitations
7.3 Further Research

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Předběžná náplň práce

Během Druhé Intifády, Izrael šokoval mezinárodní společenství tím, že se stal první zemí na světě, která veřejně přiznala užití politiky cíleného zabíjení. Přestože byla tato metoda využívána Izraelem už v předchozích konfliktech, Druhá Intifáda byla zlomovým bodem v izraelské historii z důvodu série dramatických změn, která jejich cílená politika představovala, jež se ostře lišila od té využívané předtím.
Za použití srovnávací analýzy, se tato diplomová práce zabývá 38 případy izraelských cílených operací provedených před a během Druhé Intifády s cílem určit, zda změny provedené v politice během Druhé Intifády vyústily ve více či méně úspěšné cílové operace ve srovnání s těmi vykonanými před touto dobou.
Výsledek této studie naznačuje, že s příchodem politických změn, izraelské cílové operace během Druhé Intifády byly méně úspěšné než ty vykonané před ní.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

During the Second Intifada, Israel shocked the international community by becoming the first country in the world to publically announce an overt policy of targeted-killing. While utilized by Israel in previous conflicts, the Second Intifada was a turning point in Israeli history due to a series of dramatic changes introduced to its targeting policy which would sharply contrast those which were previously utilized. This diploma thesis analyzed thirty-eight cases of Israeli targeting operations conducted both before and during the Second Intifada to determine if the changes made to its policy during the Second Intifada resulted in more or less successful targeting operations compared to those conducted prior to this time period. The results of this study indicated that, following the introduction of the aforementioned policy changes, Israeli targeting operations during the Second Intifada were less successful than those conducted prior to this time period.